Consequentialist elucidation of reasons for approving or disapproving of a given policy (virtue) is an effective persuasion technique if your values are actually right (for the people you try to confer them on), and it doesn't engage the same parts of your brain that make moralizing undesirable.

This does not match my observations.

More generally I find that I do not trust other people's explicit reasoning more than I trust their other forms of intelligence. For example I would never use this description:

What happens here is transfer of responsibility for important tasks from the imperfect machinery that historically used to manage them (with systematic problems in any given context that humans but not evolution can notice), to explicit reasoning.

We aren't moving away from imperfect machinery here. We're just moving to a different part. And a part that some suggest exist primarily for the purpose of constructing bullshit.

There is a potential for improving our moral judgement via explicit reasoning but that improvement isn't something I would expect from most people who make the shift - where by 'expect' I am mostly just talking about how I have perceived the behaviour of intelligent people when engaging in explicit moral reasoning. It takes a lot of training before you can even catch up with your 'default' (some of which Vladimir alluded to).