Well, if you pick a random sphere of 1 m out of our universe, it will - with a huge probability - be empty. I doubt we have the time/space resources to simulate the equivalent of the resources that our universe employed to produce an iPad. The fact that you could see something interesting in the limited computational resources that you likely put into your simulations might even mean that Conway's game is more interesting than our universe, and more apt to give birth to a mind (after all, it is Turing-complete).
We have never discovered a self-replicating pattern in a random life-field. I once saw a calculation that showed you would need a computer with the volume within a few orders of magnitude of the solar system to do so (not mass, volume). All the ones we have are intentionally constructed.
Most theoretical work done on self-replicators in life works by assuming ultra-low density fields, maybe one live cell per billion at the start (a proportion which immediately plummets much lower owing to the fact that cells need 2 neighbours to survive) so the empty space ...
I had posted a while back on my proposed dissolution of the Fine Tuning argument. My main argument was as follows:
I've been pondering how to process that response, and if the argument is salvageable, ever since. Do we really have to explain anthropics and the multiverse to diffuse the FTA?
Today I came across a great article with an elegant description of Ramsey's Theorem:
As I understand it, positing few 'interesting' vs. the vast majority of 'uninteresting' universes is in direct contradiction with Ramsey's theorem. I put this to the more mathematically educated among this community for feedback. Beyond pushing forward this particular internal dialog of mine, it should have more general application in the fine tuning debate, should someone choose to use it there.