I'm not sure about this "selection space" of universes, but if we're talking about all possible mathematical constructs (weighted, perhaps, according to Solomonoff's universal prior), it bears noting that even some one-dimensional, two-colour cellular automata - extremely simple systems as far as that goes - have been proven to be Turing complete. Doesn't mean they'll necessarily produce life, as a lot depends on initial conditions, but we know at least that they can, in principle, produce life. Given what else I've seen of mathematics, it seems the space of mathematically possible universes is positively teeming with critters.
even some one-dimensional, two-colour cellular automata - extremely simple systems as far as that goes - have been proven to be Turing complete
Some are, most aren't.
I had posted a while back on my proposed dissolution of the Fine Tuning argument. My main argument was as follows:
I've been pondering how to process that response, and if the argument is salvageable, ever since. Do we really have to explain anthropics and the multiverse to diffuse the FTA?
Today I came across a great article with an elegant description of Ramsey's Theorem:
As I understand it, positing few 'interesting' vs. the vast majority of 'uninteresting' universes is in direct contradiction with Ramsey's theorem. I put this to the more mathematically educated among this community for feedback. Beyond pushing forward this particular internal dialog of mine, it should have more general application in the fine tuning debate, should someone choose to use it there.