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Vaniver comments on Values vs. parameters - Less Wrong
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It seems to me that eliminating space-discounting is done for memetic, not genetic, reasons. And, as the triumph of individualistic nations over collectivist tribes shows, it outcompetes. "I trust strangers in the way a hunter-gatherer trusts his cousins" is not just a platitude for making people think you're moral, but also a good strategy for conquering the world.
Do values come from genes, and parameters from memes? The other way around? A mix? My guess is that most of our value drift will represent genetic strategies being replaced by memetic strategies, and so talking about values and parameters may not make a whole lot of sense.
It seems to me that time discounting is a heuristic to deal with death- if that issue gets resolved, then you don't need to discount as heavily. I'm not sure how a utility function would deal with memories, though- if I get to have an awesome experience at one point in my life, it seems like the earlier the better, as I can only remember the experience after I have it (I can anticipate it beforehand, but I imagine that'll be weaker). So my guess is immortals (or, at least, billion-year lifespan individuals) will have a weak preference for the present.
I think a large part of time discounting is dealing with uncertainty about the future. It's notable that people in unstable societies/situations tend to time discount more then people in more stable situations.
See Eliezer's post against discounting - I've been trying to address the problem that's left even after you factor out uncertainty.
Note that instrumental discounting is not just down to uncertainly - there's also mortality, future-impotence, resource limitations, the divide-and-conquer strategy - and so on. You should probably be trying to factor all of those things out.
Nitpick: Feeling that way would prevent you from conquering the world.
I'm inclined to agree. Unless the hunter-gatherer in question somehow had an overwhelmingly nuanced and Machiavellian instinct for trust and, presumably, extremely promiscuous relatives in a culture with significant inter-tribal mating.
As in, hunter-gatherers don't feel the way towards their cousins that citizens of the developed world are encouraged to feel towards their fellow citizens? Or that if I personally feel that way, I personally will not become the ruler of the world? Or something else?
If you really feel about strangers the way you feel about your cousins, you're not going to want to conquer them. That, or you have difficult family reunions.
I thought it was pretty obvious that I was talking about nationalism- i.e. the feeling of relatedness to all people who share a nationality with you, regardless of genetics- and not unity with all of mankind. I apologize for being unclear.
You don't conquer the world by doing what you are encouraged to do by society. You do the encouraging. Adamantly.
If the history of conquerers can be taken as a guide you trust your cousins about as far as you can preemptively execute them.
Alexander, as he existed before the rise of nationalism, is not the sort of conqueror I'm talking about. Are you telling me that British shopkeepers should have gone around preemptively executing each other?
No, I was talking about conquering the world. I don't recommend being a British shopkeeper at all if world conquest is your goal. Although Rupert Giles might like to test that theory. Maybe it even worked for him after all!
Are you referring to, instead, 'success'?