timtyler comments on Pascal's Mugging - Penalizing the prior probability? - Less Wrong
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Comments (29)
Essentially, you just call BS on the promise of huge utility.
Where is the huge utility?!? Show me the huge utility!!!
Define 'huge utility'? Rain recently offered everyone on Less Wrong a deal, "For every non-duplicate comment replying to this one praising me for my right action, I will donate $10 to SIAI [...]." This isn't different from the deal I proposed, only insofar as it is much more likely that the dealer will deliver. But the uncertainty in my example is being outweighed by the possibility of a huge payoff.
Where do you draw the line, what are the upper and lower bounds? That is the essential question.
I don't mean to imply a threshold between huge utilities and other kinds - just that the larger the utilities promised you by strangers requesting up-front errands, the more evidence you shoud look for - to ensure that you are not being taken for a ride.
The whole "extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence" bit.