wedrifid comments on Pascal's Mugging - Penalizing the prior probability? - Less Wrong

8 Post author: XiXiDu 17 May 2011 02:44PM

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Comment author: wedrifid 17 May 2011 07:26:05PM 1 point [-]

"I am the creator of the Matrix. If you fall on your knees, praise me and kiss my feet, I'll use my magic powers from outside the Matrix to run a Turing machine that simulates 3^^^^3 copies of you having their coherent extrapolated volition satisfied maximally for 3^^^^3 years."

Relevant to my decision: I don't assign all that much utility to having 3^^^^3 copies of me satisfied. In fact, the utility I assign to 3^^^^3 copies of me being satisfied is, as far as I can tell, less than double the utility I assign to two copies of me being similarly uber-satisfied.

I am actually finding it difficult to come up with a serious Pascal's Offer scenario. As far as I know my utility function doesn't even reach the sort of extremes necessary to make such an offer sound tempting.

Comment author: timtyler 18 May 2011 05:38:00PM 0 points [-]

As far as I know my utility function doesn't even reach the sort of extremes necessary to make such an offer sound tempting.

I'll have your lottery tickets, then!

Comment author: wedrifid 18 May 2011 06:38:02PM 0 points [-]

I'll have your lottery tickets, then!

If you can offer me something that gives me greater utility than my lottery tickets then I will naturally be willing to trade. This should not be surprising.