XiXiDu comments on Pascal's Mugging - Penalizing the prior probability? - Less Wrong

8 Post author: XiXiDu 17 May 2011 02:44PM

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Comment author: XiXiDu 18 May 2011 10:13:09AM 0 points [-]

Hanson's idea is that given that "A person's decision will have an affect on the well being of N people" the prior probability that you, and not someone else, is the person who gets to make that decision is 1/N.

What is the crucial difference between being 1 distinct person, of N people making N distinct decisions, and being 1 of N distinct people? In other words, why would the ability to make a decision, that is inaccessible to other decision makers, penalize the prior probability of its realization more than any other feature of distinct world-state?

I will probably have to grasp anthropic reasoning first. I am just a bit confused that if only 1 of N people faces a certain choice it becomes 1/N times more unlikely to be factual.

Comment author: JGWeissman 18 May 2011 03:42:04PM 0 points [-]

I am just a bit confused that if only 1 of N people faces a certain choice it becomes 1/N times more unlikely to be factual.

That only 1 of N people face the choice doesn't make it less likely that the choice exists, it makes less likely the conjunction of the choice existing, and that you are the one that makes the choice.