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KatjaGrace comments on On the Anthropic Trilemma - Less Wrong
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I realize that this seems to be a common view, but I can't even begin to imagine how intelligent rational people who have given the matter some thought can possibly think that they are going to be one and only one particular future self even when other future selves exist. If your future selves A and B will both exist, what could possibly be the difference between being only future self A and being only future self B? No one seems to imagine a silver thread or a magical pixie dust trail connecting their present self and a particular future self. Is this supposed to be one of those mysterious "first person facts"? How? Your current self and all of your future selves have exactly the same experiences in either case, unless you expect something to break that symmetry. What would that be?
I agree probably nothing sets apart particular copies as your future. But it shouldn't matter to questions like this. You should be able to conceptualise an arbitrary set of things as 'you' or as whatever you want to call it, even where there is no useful physical distinction to be made, and still expect probability theory to work.
Probability theory works on whatever probability spaces you define. This fact doesn't justify any particular specification of a probability space.