Jonathan_Graehl comments on On the Anthropic Trilemma - Less Wrong

33 Post author: KatjaGrace 19 May 2011 07:30PM

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Comment author: FAWS 19 May 2011 11:40:59PM *  3 points [-]

I agree, but as you allow, your (future) specific identity amongst identical copies matters very much when symmetry is broken, e.g. one copy is to be tortured and the rest pleasured.

I'm not sure I understand you. Obviously it matters to your future self A whether A is tortured or pleasured. And also to your current self whether there is a future self A that will be tortured. Do you think that, given that your future self A is tortured and your future self B pleasured, there is an additional fact as to whether you will be tortured or pleasured? I don't. And I don't see the relevance of the rest of your post to my point either.

Comment author: Jonathan_Graehl 23 May 2011 08:05:51AM *  0 points [-]

If you're searching for how I disagree with you, I don't (I thought I made that clear with "as you allow"). At first you were talking about a perfectly symmetrical situation; I was interested in a less symmetrical one.

Is there an additional fact? No, and at first I was tempted to think that it matters how if there's a continuous experience vs. a discontinuity where a scanned copy is woken up, (i.e. the original isn't destroyed, so I might care more, as the original, about what fate lies in store for it). But I think that difference doesn't even matter to me, assuming perfect copying, of course.

To indulge in another shift: maybe I'll create slave copies of myself one day. I certainly won't be allocating an even share of my resources to them (they'll hate me for it) :)