Humans often mistakenly think they face trolley problems when they really don't. This has implications for people who believe they face a trolley problem, without directly changing what constitutes a good response by someone who actually faces a trolley problem.

I'm having trouble inferring your point here... The contrast between 'those who are dreaming think they are awake, but those who are awake know they are awake' and "I refuse to extend this reply to myself, because the epistemic state you ask me to imagine, can only exist among other kinds of people than human beings" is always on the edges of every moral calculation, and especially every one that actually matters. (I guess it might sound like I'm suggesting reveling in doubt, but noticing confusion is always so that we can eventually become confused on a higher level and about more important things. Once you notice a confusion, you get to use curiosity!)

If your decision depends on referencing people's hypothetical reflectively endorsed morality, then you are not simply going with your preferences about morality, divorced from the moral systems of the many people in question.

Yeah, so this gets a little tricky because the decision forks depending on whether or not you think most people would themselves care about their future smarter selves' values, or whether you think they don't care but they're wrong for not caring. (The meta levels are really blending here, which is a theme I didn't want to avoid but unfortunately I don't think I came up with an elegant way to acknowledge their importance while keeping the spirit of the post, which is more about noticing confusion and pointing out lots of potential threads of inquiry than it is an analysis, since a real analysis would take a ton of analytic philosophy, I think.)

That you are ignoring people's stated preferences in both calculations (which remember, have the same conclusion) is similarly irrelevant. In the second but not the first you weigh people's reflective morality, so despite other (conspicuous) similarities between the calculations, there was no going back to the original calculation in reaching the second conclusion.

Ah, I was trying to hint at 3 main branches of calculation; perhaps I will add an extra sentence to delineate the second one more. The first is the original "go with whatever my moral intuitions say", the second is "go with whatever everyone's moral intuitions say, magically averaged", and the third is "go with what I think everyone would upon reflection think is right, taking into account their current intuitions as evidence but not as themselves the source of justifiedness". The third and the first are meant to look conspicuously like each other but I didn't mean to mislead folk into thinking the third explicitly used the first calculation. The conspicuous similarity stems from the fact that the actual process you would go through to reach the first and the third positions are probably the same.

The right choice will have some negative consequences, but to say it is partly evil is misleadingly calling attention to an irrelevancy, if it isn't an outright misuse of "evil"

I used some rhetoric, like using the word 'evil' and not rounding 3^^^3+1 to just 3^^^3, to highlight how the people whose fate you're choosing might perceive both the problem and how you're thinking about the problem. It's just... I have a similar reaction when thinking about a human self-righteously proclaiming 'Kill them all, God will know His own.', but I feel like it's useful that a part of me always kicks in and says I'm probably doing the same damn thing in ways that are just less obvious. But maybe it is not useful.