prase comments on Pluralistic Moral Reductionism - Less Wrong

33 Post author: lukeprog 01 June 2011 12:59AM

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Comment author: prase 01 June 2011 10:55:57AM 5 points [-]

I don't understand the terms "world of is" and "world of is not". Does "talking about world of is not" mean "deducing from false assumptions", or is there something more to it? Anyway, "talking about world of is" sounds like the worst kind of continental philosophy babble.

Else, the article is clear, comprehensible and well readable.

Comment author: lukstafi 01 June 2011 11:13:16AM 4 points [-]

While "of is, of is not" didn't hurt my understanding that much, the article would be better off without them.

Comment author: wedrifid 01 June 2011 12:03:29PM 7 points [-]

While "of is, of is not" didn't hurt my understanding that much, the article would be better off without them.

I agree, and also note that the way luke dismisses the "is not" misses much of the point that is trying to be expressed by the phrase. If it is going to be discussed at all it deserves the same kind of parameterizing as 'objective' received.

Comment author: Sniffnoy 01 June 2011 06:52:20PM 2 points [-]

It seems to be essentially a bit of wordplay, in that he uses it to mean two different things. Initially he is contrasting "is/is not" statements with "ought/ought not" statements. Later he talks about things that exist vs. things that don't exist. It doesn't seem to be very helpful though; in the earlier sense, there is no distinction between the "world of is" and the "world of is not". So this seems like it was a bad idea.

Comment author: torekp 04 June 2011 02:00:07AM 0 points [-]

I think there may be a good idea behind it though: view it as a cryptic appeal to Occam's Razor. Various moralists (e.g., Railton, Craig) were shown to be speaking of real things and properties, or of imaginary ones, with their moral language. Why not then hypothesize that all are - albeit less transparently than these two - and do away with the need of a special metaphysics or semantics (or both) for "ought" questions as "opposed" to "is" questions.

Comment author: lukeprog 08 June 2011 07:01:14AM 0 points [-]

Does this make it any clearer?

Comment author: prase 08 June 2011 11:00:43AM 0 points [-]

Yes, it does.