RichardChappell comments on Pluralistic Moral Reductionism - Less Wrong

33 Post author: lukeprog 01 June 2011 12:59AM

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Comment author: RichardChappell 03 June 2011 07:48:44PM 3 points [-]

If we taboo and reduce, then the question of "...but is it good?" is out of place. The reply is: "Yes it is, because I just told you that's what I mean to communicate when I use the word-tool 'good' for this discussion. I'm not here to debate definitions; I'm here to get something done."

I just wanted to flag that a non-reductionist moral realist (like myself) is also "not here to debate definitions". See my post on The Importance of Implications. This is compatible with thinking well of the Open Question Argument, if we think we have an adequate grasp of some fundamental normative concept (be it 'good', 'reason', or 'ought' -- I lean towards 'reason', myself, such that to speak of a person's welfare is just to talk about what a sympathetic party has reason to desire for the person's sake).

Note that if we're right to consider some normative concepts to be conceptually primitive (not analytically reducible to non-normative concepts) then your practice of "tabooing" all normative vocabulary actually has the effect of depriving us of the conceptual tools necessary to even talk about the normative sphere. Consequent talk of people's (incl. God's) desires or dispositions is simply changing the subject, on this way of looking at things.

Out of interest: Will you be arguing anywhere in this sequence against non-reductionist moral realism? Or are you simply assuming its falsity from the start, and exploring the implications from there? (Even the latter, more modest project is of course worth pursing, but I personally would be more interested in the former.) Either way, it'd be good to be clear about this. (You could then skip the silly rhetoric about how what is not "is", must be "is not".)

Comment author: lukeprog 06 June 2011 12:04:26AM 2 points [-]

I'm inclined not to write about moral non-naturalism because I'm writing this stuff for Less Wrong, where most people are physicalists.

What does it mean to you to say that something is a 'fundamental normative concept'? As in... non-reducible to 'is' statements (in the Humean sense)?

Comment author: RichardChappell 06 June 2011 01:14:53AM *  3 points [-]

I was thinking of "fundamental" concepts as those that are most basic, and not reducible to (or built up out of) other, more basic, concepts. I do think that normative concepts are conceptually isolated, i.e. not reducible to non-normative concepts, and that's really the more relevant feature so far as the OQA is concerned. But by 'fundamental normative concept' I meant a normative concept that is not reducible to any other concepts at all. They are the most basic, or bedrock, of our normative concepts.

Comment author: torekp 07 June 2011 01:22:47AM *  3 points [-]

Given the extremely poor access human beings have to the structure of their own concepts, it's dubious that the methods of analytic philosophy can trace those structures. Moreover, concepts typically "cluster together similar things for purposes of inference" ( Yudkowsky ) and thus we can re-structure them in light of new discoveries. Concepts that are connected now might be improved by disconnecting them, or vice versa. It is not at all clear that normative concepts are not included in this (Neurath-style) boat.