Peterdjones comments on Pluralistic Moral Reductionism - Less Wrong

33 Post author: lukeprog 01 June 2011 12:59AM

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Comment author: RichardChappell 08 June 2011 11:48:09PM 3 points [-]

Thanks, this is helpful. I'm interested in your use of the phrase "source of normativity" in:

The only source of normativity I think exists is the hypothetical imperative

This makes it sound like there's a new thing, normativity, that arises from some other thing (e.g. desires, or means/ends relationships). That's a very realist way of talking.

I take it that what you really want to say something more like, "The only kind of 'normativity'-talk that's naturalistically reducible and hence possibly true is hypothetical imperatives -- when these are understood to mean nothing more than that a certain means-end relation holds." Is that right?

I'd then understand you as an error theorist, since "being a means-end relationship", like "being red", is not even in the same ballpark as what I mean by "being normative". (It might sometimes have normative importance, but as we learn from Parfit, that's a very different thing.)

Comment author: lukeprog 09 June 2011 12:03:44AM 3 points [-]

My thought process on sources of normativity looks something like this:

People claim all sorts of justifications for 'ought' statements (aka normative statements). Some justify ought statements with respect to natural law or divine commands or non-natural normative properties or categorical imperatives. But those things don't exist. The only justification of normative language that fits in my model of the universe is when people use 'ought' language as some kind of hypothetical imperative, which can be translated into a claim about things reducible to physics. There are many varieties of this. Many uses of 'ought' terms can be translated into claims about things reducible to physics. If somebody uses 'ought' terms to make claims about things not reducible to physics, then I am suspicious of the warrant for those claims. When interrogating about such warrants, I usually find that the only evidences on offer are pieces of folk wisdom, intuitions, and conventional linguistic practice.

Comment author: Peterdjones 09 June 2011 01:04:08AM 0 points [-]

My thought process on sources of normativity looks something like this:

People claim all sorts of justifications for 'ought' statements (aka normative statements). Some justify ought statements with respect to natural law or divine commands or non-natural normative properties or categorical imperatives.

There's a lot of kinds of normative/"ought" statements. Some relate to games, some to rationality, and so on. Hypothetical "ought" statements do not require any special metaphysical apparatus to explain them, they just require rules and payoffs. Categorical imperatives are another story.

When interrogating about such warrants, I usually find that the only evidences on offer are pieces of folk wisdom, intuitions, and conventional linguistic practice.

One man's conventional linguistic practice is another's analytical truth.

Comment author: poqwku 11 June 2011 12:15:28AM 0 points [-]

Hypothetical "ought" statements do not require any special metaphysical apparatus to explain them, they just require rules and payoffs. Categorical imperatives are another story.

Rules and payoffs explain "ought" statements only if you assume that the rules are worth following and the payoffs worth pursuing. But if hypothetical imperatives can help themselves to such assumptions (assuming e.g. that one's own desires ought to be satisfied), then categorical imperatives can help themselves to such assumptions (assuming e.g. that everyone's desires ought to be satisfied, or that everyone's happiness ought to be maximized, or that everyone ought to develop certain character traits).

Comment author: Peterdjones 11 June 2011 09:38:17PM 1 point [-]

Rules and payoffs explain "ought" statements only if you assume that the rules are worth following and the payoffs worth pursuing.

I don't think so. You ought to use a hammer to drive in nails even if you don't want to dive in nails. Anyone who is playing chess should move the bishop diagonally.That doesn't mean you are playing chess.

Of course those are hypothetical, and non-ethical. It might wll be the case that the only categorical imperatives are moral categorical imperatives; that. ethics is the only area where you should do things or refrain form things unconditionally.

Comment author: poqwku 15 June 2011 12:27:11AM 0 points [-]

I don't think so. You ought to use a hammer to drive in nails even if you don't want to dive in nails. Anyone who is playing chess should move the bishop diagonally.That doesn't mean you are playing chess.

Again, you're assuming that the rule 'if you're driving in nails, use a hammer' is worth following, and that the rule 'if you're playing chess, move bishops diagonally' is worth following. A nihilist would reject both of those rules as having any normative authority, and say that just because a game has rules it doesn't mean that game-players ought to follow those rules, at most it means that lots and lots of rule-violations make the game go away.