[Re-post with correction]

Hi Luke,

I've questioned your metaethical views before (in your "desirist" days) and I think you're making similar mistakes now as then. But rather than rehash old criticisms I'd like to make a different point.

Since you claim to be taking a scientific or naturalized approach to philosophy I would expect you to offer evidence in support of your position. Yet I see nothing here specifically identified as evidence, and very little that could be construed as evidence. I don't see how your approach here is significantly different from the intuition-based philosophical approaches that you've criticised elsewhere.

Some people who say "Stealing is wrong" are really just trying to express emotions: "Stealing? Yuck!" Others use moral judgments like "Stealing is wrong" to express commands: "Don't steal!" Still others use moral judgments like "Stealing is wrong" to assert factual claims, such as "stealing is against the will of God" or "stealing is a practice that usually adds pain rather than pleasure to the world."

How do you know this? Where's the evidence? I don't doubt that some people say, "Stealing is wrong because it's against the will of God". But where's the evidence that they use "Stealing is wrong" to mean "Stealing is against the will of God"?

But moral terms and value terms are about what we want.

How do you know? And this seems to contradict your claim above that some people use "Stealing is wrong" to mean "stealing is against the will of God". That's not about what we want. (I say that moral terms are primarily about obligations, not wants.)