But whatever our intended meaning of 'ought' is, the same reasoning applies. Either our intended meaning of 'ought' refers (eventually) to the world of maths and physics (in which case the is-ought gap is bridged), or else it doesn't (in which case it fails to refer).12

The is-ought problem is an epistemic problem. Being informed that some A is ultimately, ontologically, the same as some B does not tell me how that A entails that B. If I cannot see how an "is" implies an "ought", being informed that the "ought" ultimately refer to states of the world -- states of the world far too complex for me to include in my epistemic calculations -- does not help. I can't cram a (representation of a) world-state into my brain. Being informed that if I could I would no longer have an is-ought problem under the unlikely circumstances that I could do so doesn't help. The ontological claim that is's and ought's ultimately have the same referents can only be justified by some epistemic procedure. That is the only way any ontological claim is justified.