What I meant by that statement was the idea that CDT works by basing counterfactuals on your action, which seems a reasonable basis for counterfactuals since prior to making your decision you obviously don't know what your action will be. TDT similarly works by basing counterfactuals on your decision, which you also don't know prior to making it.
Kant, on the other hand, bases his counter-factuals on what would happen if everyone did that, and it is possible that his will involve assuming things I know to be false in a sense that CDT and TDT don't (e.g. when deciding whether to lie I evaluate possible worlds in which everyone lies and in which everyone tells the truth, both of which I know not to be the case).
Well here is the issue.
Let's say I have to decide what to do at 2'o'clock tomorrow. If I light a stick of dynamite, I will be exploded. If I don't, then I won't. I can predict that I will, in fact, not light a stick of dynamite tomorrow. I will then know that one of my counterfactuals is true and one is false.
This can mess up the logic of decision-making. There are http://lesswrong.com/lw/2l2/what_a_reduction_of_could_could_look_like/. This ensures that you can never figure out a decision before making it, which makes things simpler.
I'm not sure if this co...
Y'all know the rules: