Dealing with ordinary things has a positive expected utility. Analysing anything that looks like a Pascal's Mugging has ~zero expected utility as far as the wager itself goes, plus that derived from curiosity and a desire to study logical problems.

I agree with your conclusion, but don't follow the reasoning. Can you say more about how you identify something that looks like a Pascal's Mugging?

If something looks like a Pascal's Mugging when it involves ridiculously large utilities, then maybe you agree with me that you should have bounded utilities.

This falls back to 3b, then: My utility function isn't calibrated to a universe where you can ignore physics.

The laws of physics are discovered, not known a-priori, so you can't really use that as a way to make decisions.

Furthermore, it also falls back to 1b: Once we assume physics doesn't apply, we get an infinite number of theories to choose from, all with equal likelihood

Not equal likelihood. Universal Prior, Solmonoff induction.

so once again why select your theory out of that chaos?

Once you have chaos, you have a problem. Selecting my theory over the others is only an issue for me if I want to collect money, but the chaos is a problem for you even if you don't select my theory. You'll end up being jerked around by some other unlikely god.

It's not elegant, but it occurred to me as a seed of a thought, and I should have a more robust version in a little bit

I'll be interested to read about it. Good luck. I hope there's something there for you to find.