Hyperreals or some other modification to the standard framework (see discussion of "infinity shades" in Bostrom) are necessary in order to say that a 50% chance of infinite utility is better than a 1/3^^^3 chance of infinite utility.

Sigh, we seem to be talking past each other. You're talking about choosing which unlikely god jerks you around, and I'm trying to say that it's eventually time to eat lunch. If you have infinite utilities, how can you ever justify prioritizing something finite and likely, like eating lunch, over something unlikely but infinite? Keeping a few dollars is like eating lunch, so if you can't rationally decide to eat lunch, the question is which unlikely god you'll give your money to. I agree that it probably won't be me.

Read the Hajek paper for the full details.

I think you mean Arguments for - and against - probabilism. If you meant something else, please correct me.