I'd be very gracious if you could take a look at my recent question and the comments. Your statement

"X is true" (where X is a mathematical statement) means something, and that thing is not "I think X is true" or "I would think that X is true if I were smarter and some other stuff".

is interesting to me. What is a counter-argument to the claim that the only way that one could claim that " "X is true" means something" is to unpack the statement "X is true" all the way down to amplitudes over configurations (perhaps in a subspace of configuration space that highly factorizes over 'statistically common arrangements of particles in human brains correlating to mathematical conclusions' or something.

Where do the intuition-sympathizers stand on the issue of logical names?

I don't think something like 'ought' can intuitively point to something that has ontological ramifications. If there is any "intuition" to it, why is it unsatisfactory to think it's merely an evolutionary effect?

From the original post above, I find a point of contention with

People who do feel that intuition run into trouble. This is because "I ought to do X' does not refer to anything that exists. How can you make a statement that doesn't refer to anything that exists?

'I ought to do X' does correspond to something that exists... namely, some distribution over configurations of human minds. It's a proposition like any other, like 'that sign is red' for example. You can track down a fully empirical and quantifiable descriptor of 'I ought to do X' with some sufficiently accurate model and measuring devices with sufficient precision. States of knowledge about what one 'ought' to do are states of knowledge like any others. When tracking down the physics of 'Ought', it will be fleshed out with some nuanced, perhaps situationally specific, definition that relates it to other existing entities.

I guess more succinctly, there is no abstract concept of 'ought'. The label 'ought' just refers to an algorithm A, an outcome desired from that algorithm O, an input space of things the algorithm can operate on, X, an assessment of the probability that the outcome happens under the algorithm, P(A(X) = O). Up to the limit of sensory fidelity, this is all in principle experimentally detectable, no?