Zetetic comments on A Defense of Naive Metaethics - Less Wrong

8 Post author: Will_Sawin 09 June 2011 05:46PM

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Comment author: Zetetic 10 June 2011 06:10:26AM *  0 points [-]

People who do feel that intuition run into trouble. This is because "I ought to do X' does not refer to anything that exists. How can you make a statement that doesn't refer to anything that exists? I've done it, and my reasoning process is still intact, and nothing has blown up. Everything seems to be fine. No one has explained to me what isn't fine about this.

Ok, I'll bite. Why does "I ought to X" have to refer to any thing?

When I see atucker's comment, for instance;

It refers to my preferences which are physically encoded in my brain. It feels like it doesn't refer to anything that exists because I don't have complete introspective access to the mechanisms by which my brain decides that it wants something.

I think "this isn't quite right, but it's kind of close"

So what, then, is "ought"? In reality it seems to derive its meaning from a finite set of functional signals. We could take it to mean:

A signal demonstrating group cohesion via expressing shared cherished beliefs "What's that? You say you aren't doing X? You ought to do X!" (murmured approval; yeah, we all do X around here, buddy!)

A signal demonstrating anxiety or indignation "Someone ought to do something to fix this!"

A signal demonstrating disapproval in the present "You oughtn't do that!", or referring to future events "You ought to do that differently from now on" or referring to the past "You ought to have done something else"

etc.

In this light we see that "ought" has no cleanly discernible referent (which makes sense because it isn't a noun), but rather derives meaning via its socially accepted usage in a set of signaling mechanisms.

Comment author: Will_Sawin 10 June 2011 04:50:35PM 1 point [-]

How deriving meaning from signaling works is sort of unclear. The strategic value of a signal depends only on what facts cause it, which is not the same as what it means. If the causal graph is

X => Y => Z => I say "fruit loop"

then "fruit loop" could mean Z, or Y, or X, or none of the above.

So I think your meaning is compatible with mine?

Comment author: Zetetic 10 June 2011 10:14:21PM 0 points [-]

So I think your meaning is compatible with mine?

If what is stated above is your meaning then I think yes. However, if that is the case then this:

Not every set of claims is reducible to every other set of claims. There is nothing special about the set "claims about the state of the world, including one's place in it and ability to affect it." If you add, however, ought-claims, then you will get a very special set - the set of all information you need to make correct decisions.

Doesn't make as much sense to me. Maybe you could clarify it for me?

In particular; it is unclear to me why Ought-claims in general, as opposed to some strict subset of ought-claims like "Action X affords me maximum expected utility relative to my utility function" <=> "I ought to do X", are relevant to making decisions. If that is the case, why not dispense with "ought" altogether? Or is that what you're actually aiming at?

Maybe because the information they signal is useful? But then there are other utterances that fall into this category too some of which are not, strictly speaking, words. So taking after that sense, the set would be incomplete. So I assume that probably isn't what you mean either.

Also judging by this:

In this essay I talk about what I believe about rather than what I care about. What I care about seems like an entirely emotional question to me. I cannot Shut Up And Multiply about what I care about. If I do, in fact, Shut Up and Multiply, then it is because I believe that doing so is right. Suppose I believe that my future emotions will follow multiplication. I would have to, then, believe that I am going to self-modify into someone who multiplies. I would only do this because of a belief that doing so is right.

Would it be safe to say that your stance is essentially an emotivist one? Or is there a distinction I am missing here?

Comment author: Will_Sawin 11 June 2011 02:12:58AM 2 points [-]

In particular; it is unclear to me why Ought-claims in general, as opposed to some strict subset of ought-claims like "Action X affords me maximum expected utility relative to my utility function" <=> "I ought to do X", are relevant to making decisions. If that is the case, why not dispense with "ought" altogether? Or is that what you're actually aiming at?

Well I guess strictly speaking not all "ought" claims are relevant to decision-making. So then I guess the argument that they form a natural category is more subtle.

I mean, technically, you don't have to describe all aspects of the correct utility function. but the boundary around "the correct utility function" is simpler than the boundary around "the relevant parts of the correct utility function"

Would it be safe to say that your stance is essentially an emotivist one? Or is there a distinction I am missing here?

No. I think it's propositional, not emotional. I'm arguing against an emotivist stance on the grounds that it doesn't justify certain kinds of moral reasoning.

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