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lukeprog comments on A Defense of Naive Metaethics - Less Wrong
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No, of course lots of people use 'ought' terms and other terms without any reduction to physics in mind. All I'm saying is that if I'm right about reductionism, those uses of ought language will fail to refer.
Sure, that's one way to use moral language. And your preference order is computed by physics.
That's the way I'm talking about, so you should be able to ignore the other ways in your discussion with me.
You are proposing a function MyOrder from {states of the world} to {preference orders}
This gives you a natural function from {statements in moral language} to {statements in physical language}
but this is not a reduction, it's not what those statements mean, because it's not what they're defined to mean.
I think I must be using the term 'reduction' in a broader sense than you are. By reduction I just mean the translation of (in this case) normative language to natural language - cashing things out in terms of lower-level natural statements.
But you can't reduce an arbitrary statement. You can only do so when you have a definition that allows you to reduce it. There are several potential functions from {statements in moral language} to {statements in physical language}. You are proposing that for each meaningful use of moral language, one such function must be correct by definition.
I am saying, no, you can just make statements in moral language which do not correspond to any statements in physical language.
Not what I meant to propose. I don't agree with that.
Of course you can. People do it all the time. But if you're a physicalist (by which I mean to include Tegmarkian radical platonists), then those statements fail to successfully refer. That's all I'm saying.
I am standing up for the usefulness and well-definedness of statements that fail to successfully refer.
Okay, we're getting nearer to understanding each other, thanks. :)
Perhaps you could give an example of a non-normative statement that is well-defined and useful even though it fails to refer? Perhaps then I can grok better where you're coming from.
Elsewhere, you said:
Goodness, no. I'm not arguing that all translations of 'ought' are equally useful as long as they successfully refer!
But now you're talking about something different than the is-ought gap. You're talking about a gap between "hypothetical-ought-statements and categorical-ought-statements." Could you describe the gap, please? 'Categorical ought' in particular leaves me with uncertainty about what you mean, because that term is used in a wide variety of ways by philosophers, many of them incoherent.
I genuinely appreciate you sticking this out with me. I know it's taking time for us to understand each other, but I expect serious fruit to come of mutual understanding.
I don't think any exist, so I could not do so.
I'm saying that the fact that you can use a word to have a meaning in class X does not provide much evidence that the other uses of that word have a meaning in class X.
Hypothetical-ought statements are a certain kind of statement about the physical world. They're the kind that contain the word "ought", but they're just an arbitrary subset of the "is"-statements.
Categorical-ought statements are statements of support for a preference order. (not statements about support.)
Since no fact can imply a preference order, no is-statement can imply a categorical-ought-statement.
(Physical facts can inform you about what the right preference order is, if you expect that they are related to the moral facts.)
perhaps the right thing to say is "No fact can alone imply a preference order."
Okay, so you think that the only class of statements that are well-defined and useful but fail to refer is the class of normative statements? Why are they special in this regard?
Agreed.
What do you mean by this? Do you mean that a categorical-ought statement is a statement of support as in "I support preference-ordering X", as opposed to a statement about support as in "preference-ordering X is 'good' if 'good' is defined as 'maximizes Y'"?
What do you mean by 'preference order' such that no fact can imply a preference order? I'm thinking of a preference order as a brain state, including parts of the preference ordering that are extrapolated from that brain state. Surely physical facts about that brain state and extrapolations from it imply (or entail, or whatever) the preference order...
Because a positive ('is") statement + a normative ("ought) statement is enough information to determine an action, and once actions are determined you don't need further information.
"information" may not be the right word.
I believe "I ought to do X" if and only if I support preference-ordering X.
I'm thinking of a preference order as just that: a map from the set of {states of the world} x {states of the world} to the set {>, =, <}. The brain state encodes a preference order but it does not constitute a preference order.
I believe "this preference order is correct" if and only if there is an encoding in my brain of this preference order.
Much like how:
I believe "this fact is true" if and only if there is an encoding in my brain of this fact.