Will_Sawin comments on A Defense of Naive Metaethics - Less Wrong
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Sure.
Let me rephrase a bit.
"That thing, over there (which we're trying to refer to with some measure of accuracy), point point".
I'm defining it extensionally, except for the fact that it doesn't physically exist.
There has to be some kind of definition or else we wouldn't know what we were talking about, even if it's extensional and hard to put into words.
"red" and "right" have different extensional definitions.
I suspect there is a difference between knowing things and being able to use them, neither generally implying the other.
This is true, but my claim that words have to have a (possibly extensional) definition for us to use them, and that "right" has an extensional definition, stands.
Does "whatever's written in that book" work as the appropriate kind of "extensional definition" for this purpose? If so, I agree, that's what I mean by "using without knowing". (As I understand it, it's not the right way of using the term "extensional definition", since you are not giving examples, you are describing a procedure for interacting with the fact in question.)
It's sort of subtle.
"Whatever's written in the book at the location given by this formula: "
defines a word totally in terms of other words, which I would call intensional.
"Whatever's written in THAT book, point point"
points at the meaning, what I would call extensional.