So in this perspective what I "want" is really a red herring. I want to do lots of things that I oughtn't do.

What matters is my beliefs about what is right and wrong.

Now, by necessity, I believe that my EV is the best possible approximation of what is right. Because, If I knew of a better approximation, I would incorporate it into my beliefs, and if I didn't know of it, my volition must not have been extrapolated far enough.

But this is not a definition of what is right. To do so would be circular.

If I believe that my EV is very close to humanity's CEV, then I believe that humanity's CEV is almost the best approximation as to what is right. I do, so I do.

So, to start reasoning, I need assumptions. My assumptions would look like:

{these moral intuitions} are fundamentally accurate

or

All my moral intuitions are fundamentally accurate

or something else, just as the assumptions I use to generate physical beliefs would consist of my intuitions about the proper techniques for induction (Bayesianism, Occam's Razor, and so on.)

There doesn't have to be any Book O' Right sitting around for me to engage in this reasoning, I can just, you know, do it.

(It is very ironic that I first developed this edifice because I was bothered by unstated moral assumptions.)