Peterdjones comments on A Defense of Naive Metaethics - Less Wrong

8 Post author: Will_Sawin 09 June 2011 05:46PM

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Comment author: lukeprog 10 June 2011 08:06:16PM 2 points [-]

How can you make a statement that doesn't refer to anything that exists? I've done it, and my reasoning process is still intact, and nothing has blown up. Everything seems to be fine. No one has explained to me what isn't fine about this. Since it's intuitive, why would you not want to do it that way?

Clearly, you can make statements about things that don't exist. People do it all the time, and I don't object to it. I enjoy works of fiction, too. But if the aim of our dialogue is true claims about reality, then you've got to talk about things that exist - whether the subject matter is 'oughts' or not.

What one is forced to do by this argument, if one wants to speak only in physical statements, is to say that "should" has a really, really long definition that incorporates all components of human value. When a simple word has a really, really long definition, we should worry that something is up.

I don't see why this needs to be the case. I can stipulate short meanings of 'should' as I use the term. People do this all the time (implicitly, at least) when using hypothetical imperatives.

Also, in general I find myself confused by your way of talking about these things. It's not a language I'm familiar with, so I suspect I'm still not fully understanding you. I'm not sure which of our anticipations differ because of the disagreement you're trying to express.

Comment author: Peterdjones 23 June 2011 01:49:33PM *  0 points [-]

But if the aim of our dialogue is true claims about reality, then you've got to talk about things that exist - whether the subject matter is 'oughts' or not.

Which would mean either that mathematical knowledge is false, or that there is a Platonic word of mathematical objects for it to correspond to.

OTOH, one could just adopt the Dogma of Empiricism that there is analytical truth which is neither 'about' physical realitty nor 'about' about any metaphysical one ( and that mathematical truth is anayltical). (and that mathematical truth is anayltical).

And if it is an analytical truth that, for instance, that you should do as you would be done by, then that is still applicable to real world situations by fulling "as you would be done by" for your own case.