Wei_Dai comments on A Defense of Naive Metaethics - Less Wrong
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That doesn't seem right. Compare (note that I don't necessarily endorse the rest of this paper) :
If you examine just one particular sense of the word "ought", even if you make clear which sense, but without systematically enumerating all of the meanings of the word, how can you know that the concept you end up studying is the one that is actually important, or one that other people are most interested in?
I suspect there are many senses of a word like 'ought' that are important. As 'pluralistic moral reductionism' states, I'm happy to use and examine multiple important meanings of a word.
Let me expand my comment a bit, because it didn't quite capture what I wanted to say.
If Will is anything like a typical human, then by "ought" he often means something other than, or more than, the sense referred to by "that sense", and it doesn't make sense to say that perhaps he wants to use "ought" in that sense.
When you say "I'm fine with ..." are you playing the role of the Austere Metaethicist who says "Tell me what you mean by 'right', and I will tell you what is the right thing to do."? But I think Austere Metaethics is not a tenable metaethical position, because when you ask a person to tell you what they mean by "right", they will almost certainly fail to give you a correct answer, simply because nobody really understands (much less can articulate) what they mean by "right". So what is the point of that?
Or perhaps what you meant to say instead was "I'm fine with Will studying 'ought' in that sense if he wants"? In that case see my grandparent comment (but consider it directed mostly towards Will instead of you).