Vladimir_Nesov comments on A Defense of Naive Metaethics - Less Wrong

8 Post author: Will_Sawin 09 June 2011 05:46PM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Article Navigation

Comments (294)

Comments (294)

You are viewing a single comment's thread. Show more comments above.

Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 08 July 2011 04:25:39PM 0 points [-]

Roger is confused enough to think that his intuitive concept of 'morally good' is 'that which produces the greatest pleasure for the greatest number'.

That intuition says the same thing as "pleasure-maximization", or that intended meaning can be captured as "pleasure-maximization"? Even if intuition is saying exactly "pleasure-maximization", it's not necessarily the intended meaning, and so it's unclear why one would try to replicate the intuitive tool, rather than search for a characterization of the intended meaning that is better than the intuitive tool. This is the distinction I was complaining about.

(This is an isolated point unrelated to the rest of your comment.)

Comment author: lukeprog 08 July 2011 04:35:58PM *  2 points [-]

Understood. I think I'm trying to figure out if there's a better way to talk about this 'intended meaning' (that we don't yet have access to) than to say 'intended meaning' or 'intuitive meaning'. But maybe I'll just have to say 'intended meaning (that we don't yet have access to)'.

New paragraph version:

But one must not fall into the trap of thinking that a definition you've stipulated (aloud or in your head) for 'ought' must match up to your intended meaning of 'ought' (to which you don't have introspective access). In fact, I suspect it never does, which is why the conceptual analysis of 'ought' language can go in circles for centuries, and why any stipulated meaning of 'ought' is a fake utility function. To see clearly to our intuitive concept of ought, we'll have to try empathic metaethics (see below).

Powered by Reddit Powered by Reddit