loqi comments on Rationality: Common Interest of Many Causes - Less Wrong
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Comments (39)
I don't believe you. Define "choose".
EDIT: My above objection is unclear. I should have replied ADBOC.
They are presented with situations in which multiple alternatives are possible, and they select one. That is choosing. Their choices may be explained by psychological, environmental and/or chemical factors, but not explained away. See Explaining vs Explaining Away.
That is too easy. When you see "someone choose to X", you'll usually take it to mean that the bloke could've done otherwise, ergo, if he choose to do something that did him wrong, he's responsible and hence, deserves the result he's obtained.
Maybe you can stretch the definition of responsibility too (stretch away http://yudkowsky.net/rational/the-simple-truth ), but the idea that people could do otherwise, or deserve their fate if they chose to do something 'wrong', knowing it was wrong to do it ... even barring the idea of a deserved fate, people often fall back to human nature, resorting to their heuristics and "general feeling about doing this or that".
That's not a choice. That's more like a curse, when your environmental conditions are just right and strong enough to give such processes PREDOMINANCE over your own 'rational' sophisticated mind. In such cases, you won't act rationally anymore; you've already been taken over, even if temporarily. We've been discussing akrasia and ego depletion a bit lately, this falls in the same category. Rationality is but the last layer of your mind. It floats over all those hardwired components of your mind. It is pretty fragile and artificial, at least when it comes to act rationally, as opposed to thinking rationally, or even easier, thinking about rationality.
So whether someone "choose it", or not, whatever meaning is bestowed upon the word choice, is not the most important thing. It's to understand why someone did something of a disservice to himself, and how he could be helped out of it, and if he should be helped out of it in the first place.
This question is totally meaningless for materialists and consequentialists. The entire business of attaching blame and deserts must be abandoned in favour of questions either to do with predictions about the world or to do with what will give the best total effect.
I'll do a post on this when I've composed it, but the start of it is the case of Phineas Gage.
I think this is too extreme. Maybe blame and desert are best dispensed with, but it seems likely that we (our volitions) terminally disvalue interference with deliberate, 'responsible' choices, even if they're wrong, but not interference with compulsions. Even if that's not the case, it also seems likely that something like our idea of responsible vs. compulsive choice is a natural joint, predicting an action's evidential value about stable, reflectively endorsed preferences, which is heuristically useful in multiple ways.
I don't think that needs to be a terminal value. People's deliberate choices provide information about what will actually make them happy; with compulsions, we have evidence that those things won't really make them happy.
I agree that it's useful to have words to distinguish what we want long-term when we think about it, and what we want short-term when tempted, and I've just done a post on that subject. However, I don't see how that helps rescue the idea of blame and deserving.
In case there was any confusion, I didn't mean to say it does.
This does not cut it. First, you need to additionally specify that they are fully aware of these multiple possibilities. When a man decides to cross the street and gets killed by junk falling from the sky, he didn't choose to die.
Second, the word "select" fully encapsulates the mystery of the word "choose" in this context.
Third (I didn't originally make this clear), I'm not looking for a fully reductive explanation of choice, so the "explaining away" discussion isn't relevant. The statement "Believe me - they choose" appears to be attempting to communicate something, and I believe the payload is hiding in the connotation of "choose" (because the denotation is pretty tautological: people's actions are the result of their choices).
Belatedly I recall prior discussion of connotation. I've edited my original reply to include the flashy LW keyword "ADBOC".
This isn't an adversarial game. How do you know I will disagree with you? Even if you did know, why avoid it?
You uttered a statement of the form "Believe me - <tautology>" in direct reply to a comment I found fairly insightful. Infotropism laid out the connotation of his use of the word "choose" quite well, IMO, and your statement seems at odds with that.
If you define "choice" to cover this scenario in the context of a "who is worth helping" discussion, I question the value of the definition.
When that is the case for a word, you cannot use it to make a clear point without a supporting explanation. I'm assuming you didn't intend to make a vague point.
I found the above comment to be mostly incoherent, so I'll reply to the meaningful parts.
Infotropism made a comment that essentially said people are more likely to help "cute puppies" than "dirty hobos" due to buggy hardware. You replied that your dog's senses are probably sharper than a hobo's, and that the hobo chose his or her condition. I deem that "participation", even if you didn't understand what was being discussed or implied.
How very condescending. Spare me your posturing.
I think I have that right because I do have that right.