Costly signaling is mostly a zero-sum game. I like to opt out of zero-sum games.
I wouldn't choose to signal this via not dressing well. Its too many inferential steps for most people, and clothing doesn't have to be super costly. Dressing to look better than other people might be zero sum, but I doubt if just dressing well is.
I think you make a very good point. Most people who don't care about clothing style, will also not care about yours. (Self-example: until I studied a bit of fashion recently, I didn't care at ALL what other people were wearing.) So signaling to them seems useless, since they are not even receiving input on that frequency.
Yesterday I attended a meetup where the discussion turned to fashion for a time (because apparently the mini-camp participants were given some instructions on fashion as a useful part of instrumental rationality). (Unfortunately none of us knew much about the topic so the discussion turned into "how can we find an expert to advise us for minimal cost?") It was mentioned that dressing "badly" can be a useful signalling device, and some examples were given. Here's an attempt at a more complete list of possible signals one might be sending by dressing "badly".
The idea here is, if you do decide to start dressing "well", know what you're giving up first. (Of course you're also giving up possibly implying that nobody taught you how to dress and you're not sufficiently strategic to have thought of learning it yourself. Or implying that you don't have the mental, financial, and/or social resources to keep up with fashion. A lot of signaling depends on what your audience already knows about you, or can infer from your other signals.) See also Yvain's related post, Why Real Men Wear Pink and comments there.