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TobyBartels comments on Malice, Stupidity, or Egalité Irréfléchie? - Less Wrong
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So, fearing that A is signalling a desire to leave the group, B discourage A's new behaviour; to counteract this, A seeks out a new peer group, increasing the odds that A does end up leaving the group. So B is engaging in classic self-defeating behaviour ... unless, of course, the peer pressure succeeds.
Unfortunately, B's response to A may well be rational, if B expects other Bs to react the same way, leading A to leave the group unless B can make the peer pressure on A to conform strong enough. The various Bs are in something like the prisoner's dilemma with each other; (if I knew my catalogue of game theory better, I'd be able to say just what they're in).
Which it usually does. In the ancestral environment, opportunities for seeking out a new peer group were quite limited, so our brains don't quite realize they can do it; they're still quite biased towards keeping the existing group happy.
If this weren't the case, it wouldn't be so necessary for wealth, self-help, PUA, and other gurus to harp on the importance of doing it, and of being prepared for a negative response from your existing peer group.
Well, their problem is not opposing interests. In your model, they seem to have the same interests - they're just at the wrong Nash equilibrium.
Right, it's definitely not PD. And it's not Chicken. As you say, it's one with two Nash equilibria, a good one at both-cooperate and a worse one at both-defect. I just don't remember what it's called and don't know where to find out online.