With an exception for the implied invisible, which does not pay rent in future anticipations.
It seems to pay rent in not having to store a more complex theory that says things behave differently when a human doesn't see them. My previous elaboration on this theme.
Edit: I'm a bit hesitant in defending it this way because I'm not sure if this standard for what pays rent is overbroad.
Belief in the implied invisible also pays a little rent in anticipated experience conditional on improbable observations.
Today's post, Making Beliefs Pay Rent (in Anticipated Experiences), was originally published on 28 July 2007. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
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