Also, Drescher points out a particular error that DBDT makes: in Newcomb's problem, if Omega chooses the contents of the box before the agent is born, the agent will two-box.

The actual objection was:

I don't think DBDT gives the right answer if the predictor's snapshot of the local universe-state was taken before the agent was born (or before humans evolved, or whatever), because the "critical point", as Fisher defines it, occurs too late.

Surely, as I pointed out at the time, the author already covered that in the paper. See this bit:

For now, let us take it for granted that, in short-duration scenarios like Newcomb’s problem and the psychologically-similar prisoners’ dilemma, the critical point comes prior to the first events mentioned in standard descriptions of these scenarios. (See Figure 1.)

...and this bit:

The critical point in Newcomb’s problem comes prior to the visit to the predictor.

Yudkowsky's objection is based on the same mistake. He says:

there's still a possibility that DBDT will end up two-boxing if Omega takes a snapshot of the (classical) universe a billion years ago before DBDT places the "critical point"

...but this directly contradicts what it says in the paper about where that point is located:

the critical point must come before the contents of the opaque box are determined.

...and...

the critical point comes prior to the first events mentioned in standard descriptions of these scenarios.