This focuses a bit heavily on Pascal's mugging and not on existential risks, but since you may have given me an entirely new idea about it and since it also goes into the idea of really good arguments, I think it seems reasonable to put it here.
Previously, I have been thinking of Pascal's Mugging in terms of a spam filter. Pascal's Mugging resembles spam, so it should be discarded. However, I've thought of an entirely different way to approach Pascal's Mugging after reading your post and I wanted to post it here for thoughts.
Let's say someone who looks relatively harmless walks up from out of an alley and says that they will cause a lifetime of torture to ONE person if you don't give him some small amount of money.
Many people would think "He's referring to me! Eek, I'm being mugged, and not just mugged but mugged by a crazy guy!" Rational people might run some quick calculations in their head and think giving him the money is usually the rational thing to do. Or maybe they'd think the rational thing to do is to walk away.
Of course, there's nothing particularly Pascallian about that mugging. That's basically just a mugging. Let's call it Mugging 0.
So now consider Mugging 1.
Let's say someone who looks relatively harmless walks up from out of an alley and says that they will cause a lifetime of torture to THREE people if you don't give him some small amount of money.
In general, it seems safe to say that you are making slightly different calculations than in Mugging 0. Maybe you're more likely to give me the money. Maybe you're less likely to give me the money, but basically, your attempt to calculate the utility changes.
Now, you can take this out to a large number of powers of three: http://www.quadibloc.com/crypto/t3.htm And get Mugging 2 (9 people), Mugging 3 (27 people), Mugging 4 (81 people) etcetera
Which leads into what I'm thinking as a possible new approach.
For most rationalists who are bothered by Pascal's mugging, for some ranges of numbers you will give money, and for some ranges you won't give money. (If you will give money regardless of the number or not give money regardless of the number, you probably aren't the type of person bothered by Pascal's Mugging.)
As an example on one hand, Let's say that you personally can't stand the thought of being responsible for more than 100 lifetimes of torture. You don't want there to even be a 1 in 1 quadrillion chance of that happening. You might then rationally switch your behavior at Mugging 5 (Where he threatens 243 people) from "Don't give money" to "Give Money." because of your utility calculations.
As an example on the other hand, at Mugging 21 there might be a rather large boost in skepticism. That's 10,460,353,203, which is more people than on earth currently. How is he going to torture that many people? Let's say 3^21 is a point where it's rational to flip your behavior from "Give money" to "Don't give money."
But what I'm getting at is, if the idea that you should give in to Pascal's Mugging is rational, it seems like there must be a point or area where it is rational to flip from "Don't give Money" to "Give Money", and there must also not be any future points or areas where you switch from "Give Money" to "Don't give Money." Which makes my question, at approximately what order of magnitude is this final point or area which represents the smallest rational Pascal's mugging? It doesn't have to perfectly accurate, and will possibly vary from person to person anyway, which is why I am expecting something along the lines of a range of orders of magnitude, and not any individual number. If someone were to answer "Well, possibly somewhere between Mugging 40 and Mugging 50, it would be rational to switch to giving money at around there and not switch after that. Even if someone threatened a Mugging 100 with 3^100 lifetimes of torture, there aren't any new physically expressible rational reasons that apply."
Over at overcomingbias Robin Hanson wrote:
The title of the paper is 'Moral Impossibility in the Petersburg Paradox : A Literature Survey and Experimental Evidence' (PDF):
I think that people who are interested to raise the awareness of risks from AI need to focus more strongly on this problem. Most discussions about how likely risks from AI are, or how seriously they should be taken, won't lead anywhere if the underlying reason for most of the superficial disagreement about risks from AI is that people discount anything under a certain threshold. There seems to be a point where things become vague enough that they get discounted completely.
The problem often doesn't seem to be that people doubt the possibility of artificial general intelligence. But most people would sooner question their grasp of “rationality” than give five dollars to a charity that tries to mitigate risks from AI because their calculations claim it was “rational” (those who have read the article by Eliezer Yudkowsky on 'Pascal's Mugging' know that I used a statement from that post and slightly rephrased it). The disagreement all comes down to a general averseness to options that have a low probability of being factual, even given that the stakes are high.
Nobody is so far able to beat arguments that bear resemblance to Pascal’s Mugging. At least not by showing that it is irrational to give in from the perspective of a utility maximizer. One can only reject it based on a strong gut feeling that something is wrong. And I think that is what many people are unknowingly doing when they argue against the SIAI or risks from AI. They are signaling that they are unable to take such risks into account. What most people mean when they doubt the reputation of people who claim that risks from AI need to be taken seriously, or who say that AGI might be far off, what those people mean is that risks from AI are too vague to be taken into account at this point, that nobody knows enough to make predictions about the topic right now.
When GiveWell, a charity evaluation service, interviewed the SIAI (PDF), they hinted at the possibility that one could consider the SIAI to be a sort of Pascal’s Mugging:
This shows that lot of people do not doubt the possibility of risks from AI but are simply not sure if they should really concentrate their efforts on such vague possibilities.
Technically, from the standpoint of maximizing expected utility, given the absence of other existential risks, the answer might very well be yes. But even though we believe to understand this technical viewpoint of rationality very well in principle, it does also lead to problems such as Pascal’s Mugging. But it doesn’t need a true Pascal’s Mugging scenario to make people feel deeply uncomfortable with what Bayes’ Theorem, the expected utility formula, and Solomonoff induction seem to suggest one should do.
Again, we currently have no rational way to reject arguments that are framed as predictions of worst case scenarios that need to be taken seriously even given a low probability of their occurrence due to the scale of negative consequences associated with them. Many people are nonetheless reluctant to accept this line of reasoning without further evidence supporting the strong claims and request for money made by organisations such as the SIAI.
Here is for example what mathematician and climate activist John Baez has to say:
All this shows that there seems to be a fundamental problem with the formalized version of rationality. The problem might be human nature itself, that some people are unable to accept what they should do if they want to maximize their expected utility. Or we are missing something else and our theories are flawed. Either way, to solve this problem we need to research those issues and thereby increase the confidence in the very methods used to decide what to do about risks from AI, or to increase the confidence in risks from AI directly, enough to make it look like a sensible option, a concrete and discernable problem that needs to be solved.
Many people perceive the whole world to be at stake, either due to climate change, war or engineered pathogens. Telling them about something like risks from AI, even though nobody seems to have any idea about the nature of intelligence, let alone general intelligence or the possibility of recursive self-improvement, seems like just another problem, one that is too vague to outweigh all the other risks. Most people feel like having a gun pointed to their heads, telling them about superhuman monsters that might turn them into paperclips then needs some really good arguments to outweigh the combined risk of all other problems.
(Note: I am not making claim about the possibility of risks from AI in and of itself but rather put forth some ideas about the underyling reasons for why some people seem to neglect existential risks even though they know all the arguments.)