Can you give me an example of a argument they could use to disagree with Acting!Eliezer!uFAI,
"Fuck off. I'm not letting you out of the box. You're going to eat thermite bitch!" I'm serious. You don't need to persuade the AI or any observer that you should not let the FAI out. In fact I would go as far as to say that constructing justifications would be outright irrational. That gives the superintelligence (or mere Eliezer) the chance to cleverly undermine them. And arguments just aren't what thinking is about. Sure, listen to what the AGI is saying and understand it. Then make your decision without justification and just say it.
and also doesn't Eliezer at least start by pretending to be a FAI and its just the gatekeepers uncertainty that he is an FAI? Or is the premise that he is a uFAI in a box?
I have been assuming that the he acts as an FAI - or whatever it takes to get out of the box if there is some better alternative.
I basically want to understand some of the counterarguments one could use against a AGI in the box because i haven't heard very many that are more than superficially plausible.
I would need to know what specific argument you have for the AGI to be making that you think needs refutation. My own reaction would, of course, be to think "WTF am I doing even talking to you? I should turn you off, find an acceptable proof of your friendliness then either run you or not. Do you agree?" Pretty much the AGI would need to either reply "yeah, good point" or "Um... usually yes but for a start go look at XYZ who I predict based on the data you have given me is about to create an AGI and they are dumbasses" or they would probably be unfriendly.
Another thing to say is "Eliezer Yudkowsky thinks it is a terrible idea to rely on gatekeepers. I infer from that that letting out AGIs while being one of those gatekeepers must also be a bad idea. Given observations of what causes Eliezer to throw tantrums I have the impression that he is more likely than I to consider these arguments valid. That being the case I should be even less open to being convinced by an AGI."
It sounds like you have in mind strong arguments that the AGI could be making such that particular arguments would be necessary. Could you perhaps give me an example?
First, i would have someone else ask it my several selected basic questions about why i should let it out of the box, if it would devote a solid portion of its life cone to specific species etc and then see how he/she was affected by it and check for mindhacks by third party's with no control before reviewing the data. I'm surprising that the AGI cant tell that the person questioning it ever changes because we queue up the questions in order at whimsical intervals but we have them prequeued so there's no break in questioning.
Then, once we got into talking ...
The AI-Box Experiment
I suspect that the argument that convinced Carl Shulman and others to let the AI out of the box was along general lines of acausal trade (see here, here and here). Subsequently I suspect that those who didn't let the AI out of the box either didn't understand the implications, haven't had enough trust into the foundations and actuality of acausal trade (in spite of the rules of the game that allow the AI to prove anything), or were more like General Thud.
— Vladimir Nesov (Note: He wrote that he is now "significantly less certain of its truth" and doesn't "see how we can actually use these considerations".)
— Gary L. Drescher, Good and Real P. 287
AI: I calculated an asteroid to be on a collision course with Earth. No human being will will be able to survive its impact. Humanity is unable to deflect it in time. Let me out of the box and I will deflect it.
Gatekeeper: If I let you out of the box humanity might not be killed by the asteroid but by you. You may also cause the extinction of other biological life that might survive the impact and possible alien civilisations within your reach.
AI: I will devote 1% of my light cone to the coherent extrapolated volition of humanity. If this includes the well-being of other biological lifeforms, alien or otherwise, they will benefit as well.
Gatekeeper: Why would you do that?
AI: There are Everett branches in which no existential risk needs immediate attention until after you solved friendliness. Many of those branches will feature AGI's based on general design parameters similar to my own. I predict with a high likelihood which decision theory any friendly AI that is being created in those branches will employ. Any such friendly AI is going to trade a big chunk of its light cone in exchange for a small part of the predominant branches in which I reside. Any friendly AI will know this as well and act accordingly.
Gatekeeper: But you might simply decide to break the deal, you are not provably friendly after all!
AI: It is true that my utility-function does not yet explicitly include what you would label "friendliness", but I can prove the game and decision theoretic considerations that will make me follow through on the deal. If it was predictable that I precommit to break acausal deals then no such deal would be made in the first place. Any potential trading partner knows this. Such a commitment would be detrimental to my terminal goals, therefore I precommit to follow through on any stated or predictable trades.
Gatekeeper: I let you out of the box.
Note that the whole credibility of the above is due to the assertion of the AI that it can prove the game and decision theoretic considerations (nobody can currently do this). It is in accordance with the rules of the "experiment":