I especially don't identify with the utility monsters (i.e. people who call everything a bias and want to act like fictitious superintelligences). But I am generally interested to learn.

I think more people should be real superintelligences. By that I mean, be perfect. I would say "try to be like a superintelligence" but that's just not right at all. But thinking about what perfection would look like, what wu wei would look like, moving elegantly, smiling peacefully, thinking clear flowing thoughts that cut away all delusions with their infinite sharpness, not chained by past selves, not pretending to be Atlas. Johan Liebert, except, ya know, not an insane serial killer with no seriously attainable goal. A Friendly Johan Liebert. Maybe that's what I should aim for, seeing as Eliezer's a wannabe Light Yagami apparently. My surname was once Liebert.

On one side there is LW and then there is everyone else. Both sides call each other idiots.

They both get Bayes points!

I thought I left all that behind, just to learn that there are atheists who believe exactly the same just using different labels.

This statement prompted me to finally non-jokingly admit to myself that I'm a theist. I still don't know if God is a point, ring, cyclic, or chaotic attractor, though, even metaphorically speaking... improper uniformish priors over universal prior languages, the set theoretic multiverse, category theory, analogy and equivalence, bleh. I should go to a Less Wrong meetup some time, it'll be effing hilarious. Bwa ha ha. I should write a book, called "Neomonadology", coauthor it with Mitchell Porter, edited by Steve Rayhawk, have it further edited and commented on by my philosopher colleagues. He could talk about extreme low-level physics, I could talk about extreme high-level cosmology, trade off chapters, meet in the middle contentwise (and end pagewise) at decision theory, talk about ontology of agency, preferences as knowledge-processes embedded in time, reversible computation, some quantum thought problems for reflective decision theory, some acausal thought problems for reflective decision theory, go back in time and rewrite it using Hofstadter magicks, bam, published, most interesting book ever, acausal fame and recognition.

But at the same time all this is sufficiently distracting and disturbing that I can't just ignore it either.

More unasked for advice: Τώ ξιφεί τόν δεσμό λελύσθαι

By that I mean, you are stressed because you are a faced with an intractable knot, so what you really need to do is optimize your knot-undoing procedure. That is, study epistemic rationality, and ignore all that instrumental rationality bullshit. There are but six basic rules of instrumental rationality, and all require nigh-infinitely strong epistemic rationality: figure out who or what you are, figure out who or what you affect/effect, figure out who or what you and the things you affect value or are affected by or what they 'should' value or be affected by, meta-optimize, meta-optimize, meta-optimize. Those are all extremely hard and all much more important than any object-level policy decision. You are in infinite contexts controlling infinite things, think big. Get closer to God. Optimize your strategy, never your choice. That insight coincidentally doubles in a different context as being the heart of TDT.

For how long have you thought about this? Or is it that obvious?

Someone suggested a few weeks ago that you were exhibiting Roko-like tension-resolution behaviors. I didn't really think about it much at the time. But the context came up a few comments above where you were talking about Roko and that primed me, and from there it's pretty easy to fill in a lot of details.

The longer version ends the same way but starts with: About a month ago there was a phase transition from a fluid jumble of ideas to a crystalline semi-coherent vocabulary for thinking and talking about social psychology, though of course the inchoate intuitions had been there for many years. Recently I've adopted Steve Rayhawk's style of social analysis: making everything explicit, always going meta and going meta about going meta, distinguishing between wants/virtues and double-negative wants/virtues, emphasizing the importance of concessions and demands of concessions, et cetera. I think I focus on contempt qua contempt somewhat more than he does, he probably has much finer language for that than I do since it's incredibly important to model correctly if one is reasoning about social epistemology, which is itself an incredibly important thing to reason about correctly. Anyway I've learned a lot from Steve.

I remember being tempted to reply to your original comment RE Roko with just "/facepalm" and take the -4 karma hit for the lulz but I figured it was a decent opportunity to, ya know, not troll for once. But there's something twistedly satisfying about saying something you know will be dismissed for reasons that it would be easy for you to demonstrate are unvirtuous, unreflective, and unsophisticated. Steven Kaas (User:steven0461, Black Belt Bayesian) IMed me a few days ago:

Steven: I don't like when people downvote my lesswrong comments without commenting, because then I never get to learn what's wrong with them
Steven: the people that is