The statement about strong visualization (essentially simulating experiences as closely as possible) is taken from the video and personal (and anecdotal) experience with the method. The reinforcement from actual completion refers to how once you've completed the task you were motivating yourself to do, you should get the feeling of reward you were imagining to motivate yourself. Actually experiencing the reward makes it easier to simulate if you need to become motivated again later. Additionally the mental connection you'll make between completing the task and the reward makes it less likely that you'll need to repeat the exercise for that task, unless it has an extremely high activation cost: the next time you go to do the task, one of the first things that comes to mind will likely be the reward you felt last time(s) you performed it.
Perhaps I wasn't clear; I wasn't asking for your conclusions (which were already stated) or your hypothesized mechanisms for those conclusions, but rather, I was asking for evidence and definitions. Would you be willing to share the evidence that led you to formulate the above hypotheses?
I am particularly concerned because some of what you have said sounds like the sort of thing that one might anticipate about the process, but which is not actually the case at all. For example, I have seen no evidence of a reinforcement process such as you describe. (Qu...
During the sessions at the 2011 rationality minicamp, we learned that some of our biases can be used constructively, rather than just tolerated and avoided.
For example, in an excellent article discussing intuitions and the way they are formed, psychologist Robin Hogarth recommends that "if people want to shape their intuitions, [they should] make conscious efforts to inhabit environments that expose them to the experiences and information that form the intuitions that they want."
Another example: Carl Shulman remarked that due to the availability heuristic we anticipate car crashes with frequencies determined by how many people we know of or have heard about who have gotten into one. So if you don't fear car crashes but you want to acquire a more accurate level of concern about driving, you could seek out news or footage of car crashes. Video footage may work best, because experiential data unconsciously inform our intuitions more effectively than, say, written data.
This fact may lie behind many effective strategies for getting your brain to do what you want it to do:
In The Mystery of the Haunted Rationalist we see a someone whose stated beliefs don't match their anticipations. Now we can actually use the brain's machinery to get it to do what we want it to: alieve that ghosts aren't real or dangerous. One method would be for our ghost stricken friend to get people to tell her detailed stories about pleasant nights they spent in haunted houses (complete with spooky details) where nothing bad happened. Alternatively, she could read some books or watch some videos with similar content. Best of all would be if she spent a month living in a 'haunted' house, perhaps after doing some of the other things to soothe her nerves. There are many who will attest that eventually one 'gets used to' the scary noises and frightening atmosphere of an old house, and ceases to be scared when sleeping in similar houses.
I attribute the effectiveness of these tactics mostly to successful persuasion of the non-conscious brain using experiential data.
So, it seems we have a (potentially very powerful) new technique to add to our rationalist arsenal. To summarize:
Examples:
It can be annoying when our unconsciously moderated aliefs don't match our rationality-influenced beliefs, but luckily our aliefs can be trained.
1 Thanks to Hugh Ristik for talking about this at minicamp.
2 Credit for this example goes to Brandon Reinhart.
Special thanks to Luke for all the help