wedrifid comments on Preference For (Many) Future Worlds - Less Wrong

18 Post author: wedrifid 15 July 2011 11:31PM

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Comment author: CarlShulman 16 July 2011 01:39:50AM *  20 points [-]

I think this sidesteps the underlying intuitions too quickly. We have cognitive mechanisms to predict "our next experience," memories of this algorithm working well, and preferences in terms of "our next experience." If we become convinced by the data that this model of a unique thread of experience is false, we then have problems in translating preferences defined in terms of that false model. We don't start with total utilitarian-like preferences over the fates of our future copies (i.e. most aren't eager to lower their standard of living by a lot so as to be copied many times (with the copies also having low standards of living)), and one needs to explain why to translate our naive intuitions into the additive framework (rather than something more like averaging).

Comment author: wedrifid 16 July 2011 03:50:41PM 10 points [-]

I think this sidesteps the underlying intuitions too quickly.

I think you are right. I also seem not to have conveyed quite the same position as the one I intended. That is:

  • Quantum Suicide is not something that you "Believe In" but rather a preference that in all worlds in which you don't win you are killed.
  • This is a valid, coherent and not intrinsically irrational goal.
  • You don't get more "winningness" by killing yourself.
  • The Everett branches in which you are killed are just as real as the ones where you are alive. They are not trimmed from reality.

These are the points I have found myself wishing I had a post to link to when I have been asked to explain a position. Going on to explain in detail why I have the preferences I have would open up another post or three worth of discussion of whether existence in more branches is equivalent to copies and a bunch of related philosophical questions like those that you allude to.

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