Jordan comments on Preference For (Many) Future Worlds - Less Wrong
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Comments (37)
With QS you must guard yourself against all local Everett branches. Those branches could conceivably contain black swans, like a few electrons tunneling out of a circuit preventing a CPU from performing correctly. Even that is a 1:1,000,000,000 or more event. But they will not contain something macroscopic.
If I look around and notice no one nearby, I might say "I am only 99% confident that there isn't anyone near." If I then sample all local branches (with a device that has a 1:1,000,000 fail rate), killing myself in those branches that no one appears, what is the probability that I will find myself in a branch with another person nearby? I would say about 1%. The presence or absence of another person should behave classically for the small numbers we are talking about. Quantum probabilities are different than my own Bayesian probabilities.
In short, while some failure modes will become more common, others will not.
I agree (for the same reasons you specified.) It becomes even more complicated when trying to account for a probability distribution over possible quantum configurations that could lead to your own subjective state. Because culling from the futures of some possible current states makes the other possible 'now's considered to be more relevant there are additional failure modes that become even more likely to be relevant.