PhilGoetz comments on Preference For (Many) Future Worlds - Less Wrong

18 Post author: wedrifid 15 July 2011 11:31PM

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Comment author: PhilGoetz 16 July 2011 10:58:23PM 3 points [-]

Here we see just as many futures in which Blue ends up with the jackpot. And this time Blue manages not to kill himself in branches where he loses. Blue is sad for a while until he makes some more money and gets over it. He isn’t dead. This is obviously just plain better.

If you are an average utilitarian, then it is better to kill yourself if you lose in quantum roulette. It increases your average utility. This is the same reasoning that makes an average utilitarian prefer to kill off the poorer members of society.

Comment author: lessdazed 17 July 2011 11:54:40AM 3 points [-]

This is the same reasoning that makes an average utilitarian prefer to kill off the poorer members of society.

Can you name that person? I might like to talk with him or her.

Comment author: wedrifid 16 July 2011 11:10:09PM *  1 point [-]

If you are an average utilitarian, then it is better to kill yourself if you lose in quantum roulette. It increases your average utility. This is the same reasoning that makes an average utilitarian prefer to kill off the poorer members of society.

Agree, with the following clarification:

Average (or total) utilitarian preferences are analogous to preferences for many future selves but we should remember that they are not the same thing. Choosing to take an average over yourself in future everett branches is an entirely different decision to choosing to average utility of a population in one branch. (I liked the language Carl used).

Most average utilitarians will not want to commit quantum suicide*. However, "Average utilitarian-like preferences over many future selves" does seem like a good recipe for being quantum suicidal.

* Disclaimer: Being an average utilitarian in the first place is already insane. So I cannot really speak for what they prefer when things get complicated.

Comment author: PhilGoetz 17 July 2011 04:40:37AM 0 points [-]

Average (or total) utilitarian preferences are analogous to preferences for many future selves but we should remember that they are not the same thing.

Why are they not the same thing? (Or, manifestations of the same thing?)

Comment author: wedrifid 17 July 2011 05:59:47AM 1 point [-]

Why are they not the same thing? (Or, manifestations of the same thing?)

Because there is one guy who is averaging some metric based on every person in the population and there is a different guy who is averaging some metric about future outcomes of himself excluding those where he is dead.

The similarities seem to be along the lines of "do silly math then decide to kill losers".

Comment author: Desrtopa 16 July 2011 11:19:53PM 1 point [-]

If you are an average utilitarian, then it is better to kill yourself if you lose in quantum roulette. It increases your average utility.

What about the utility of the acquaintances affected by your suicide?

Comment author: PhilGoetz 17 July 2011 04:39:19AM 1 point [-]

That is a complicating factor; but it has the same impact in either case (quantum roulette player vs. average utilitarian dictator).

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