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The fundamental flaw in this game is the separation of 'me' from the 'many possible worlds' that I may occupy. Abstracting the self from the world is done as a matter of convenience, but there are just as many possible "Me's" as there are possible future states in which 'I' exist. In Quantum Roullette, what if the new 'me' in the new state doesn't care about being rich, or what if inflation has devalued my wealth, or what if it's a possible world without the money-form?
Reality wouldn't be mean to you on purpose.
Of course there would be worlds where something would have gone horribly wrong if you won the lottery. But there's no reason for you to expect that you'd wake up in one of those worlds because you won the lottery. The difference between your "horribly wrong" worlds (don't care about money/ inflation / no money) and wedrifid's (lost the lottery and became crippled) is that waking up in wedrifid's is caused by one's participation in the lottery.