Pavitra comments on Secrets of the eliminati - Less Wrong

93 Post author: Yvain 20 July 2011 10:15AM

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Comment author: [deleted] 18 July 2011 01:14:05AM 25 points [-]

I wonder:

if you had an agent that obviously did have goals (let's say, a player in a game, whose goal is to win, and who plays the optimal strategy) could you deduce those goals from behavior alone?

Let's say you're studying the game of Connect Four, but you have no idea what constitutes "winning" or "losing." You watch enough games that you can map out a game tree. In state X of the world, a player chooses option A over other possible options, and so on. From that game tree, can you deduce that the goal of the game was to get four pieces in a row?

I don't know the answer to this question. But it seems important. If it's possible to identify, given a set of behaviors, what goal they're aimed at, then we can test behaviors (human, animal, algorithmic) for hidden goals. If it's not possible, that's very important as well; because that means that even in a simple game, where we know by construction that the players are "rational" goal-maximizing agents, we can't detect what their goals are from their behavior.

That would mean that behaviors that "seem" goal-less, programs that have no line of code representing a goal, may in fact be behaving in a way that corresponds to maximizing the likelihood of some event; we just can't deduce what that "goal" is. In other words, it's not as simple as saying "That program doesn't have a line of code representing a goal." Its behavior may encode a goal indirectly. Detecting such goals seems like a problem we would really want to solve.

Comment author: Pavitra 03 August 2011 02:20:32AM 4 points [-]

I suspect that "has goals" is ultimately a model, rather than a fact. To the extent that an agent's behavior maximizes a particular function, that agent can be usefully modeled as an optimizer. To the extent that an agent's behavior exhibits signs of poor strategy, such as vulnerability to dutch books, that agent may be better modeled as an algorithm-executer.

This suggests that "agentiness" is strongly tied to whether we are smart enough to win against it.

Comment author: wedrifid 03 August 2011 09:46:46AM 2 points [-]

I suspect that "has goals" is ultimately a model, rather than a fact. To the extent that an agent's behavior maximizes a particular function, that agent can be usefully modeled as an optimizer. To the extent that an agent's behavior exhibits signs of poor strategy, such as vulnerability to dutch books, that agent may be better modeled as an algorithm-executer.

This suggests that "agentiness" is strongly tied to whether we are smart enough to win against it.

This principle is related to (a component of) the thing referred to as 'objectified'. That is, if a person is aware that another person can model it as an algorithm-executor then it may consider itself objectified.