CarlShulman comments on What's wrong with simplicity of value? - Less Wrong

18 Post author: Wei_Dai 27 July 2011 03:09AM

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Comment author: CarlShulman 27 July 2011 07:59:25PM *  3 points [-]

I meant that there's been little progress in the sense of generating theories precise enough to offer concrete recommendations, things that might be coded into an AI, e.g. formal criteria for identifying preferences, pains, and pleasures in the world (beyond pointing to existing humans and animals, which doesn't pin down the content of utilitronium), or a clear way to value different infinitely vast worlds (with all the rearrangement issues discussed in Bostrom's "Infinitarian Challenge" paper). This isn't just a matter of persistent moral disagreement, but a lack of any comprehensive candidates that actually tell you what to do in particular situations rather than having massive lacunae that are filled in by consideration of individual cases and local intuitions.

then that seems sufficient to make "narrow down the exact form of utilitarianism" a potentially better plan than "implement CEV" from their perspective

This seems to me more about the "C" than the "EV." I think such a utilitarian should still be strongly concerned with having at least their reflective equilibrium extrapolated. Even a little uncertainty about many dimensions means probably going wrong, and it seems that reasonable uncertainty about several of these things (e.g. infinite worlds and implications for probability and ethics) is in fact large.

Comment author: Wei_Dai 27 July 2011 09:28:30PM 1 point [-]

I meant that there's been little progress in the sense of generating theories precise enough to offer concrete recommendations, things that might be coded into an AI, e.g. formal criteria for identifying preferences, pains, and pleasures in the world (beyond pointing to existing humans and animals, which doesn't pin down the content of utilitronium)

One could argue that until recently there has been little motivation amongst utilitarians to formulate such precise theories, so you can't really count all of the past 60 years as evidence against this being doable in the next few decades. Some of the problems weren't even identified until recently, and others, like how to identify pain and pleasure, could be informed by recent or ongoing science. And of course these difficulties have to be compared with the difficulties of EV. Perhaps I should just say that it's not nearly as obvious that "hard-coding" is a bad idea, if "complexity of value" refers to the complexity of a precise formulation of utilitarianism, for example, as opposed to the complexity of "Godshatter".

Even a little uncertainty about many dimensions means probably going wrong, and it seems that reasonable uncertainty about several of these things (e.g. infinite worlds and implications for probability and ethics) is in fact large.

Is it plausible that someone could reasonably interpret lack of applicable intuitions along some dimensions as indifference, instead of uncertainty?