Not really. Pascal's Wager's domain is afterlives, about which we know nothing (either because they're false or because no one can tell us anything). But cryonics has its domain over future possibilities, about which we can know things and so can assign meaningful prior estimates.
I'm not sure that this distinction is important to the argument. Let's assume for the sake of argument that evidence is discovered which allows one to assign meaningful probabilities to the claim that accepting Jesus will guaranty a trip to heaven for eternity after one's death. Let's further suppose that this probability is roughly one in one billion. Would that change anything about the argument? I don't think so. Pascal's wager would still have the same basic flaws.
While we certainly can think of errant possibilia that make cryonics bad, they are notably errant, requiring us to posit a future incredibly unlike the present, the past and the kinds of changes we see in the world.
I'm not sure I would put it at "incredibly unlike the present." After all, there is a lot of hostility to cryonics. And history shows that politics can be pretty chaotic.
Still, you seem to agree that one can make a meaningful estimate of the probability that future public policy will make people worse off for having chosen to sign up for cryonics. So what's your rough estimate of that probability?
The problem with this is that, once we assign meaningful probabilities to Pascal's Wager, the conceit succeeds or fails based on those probabilities.
My estimate of a dystopian future in which you'd rather be dead than alive and, yet, somehow you are awakened into that world: basically zero.
From Mike Darwn's Chronopause, an essay titled "Would You Like Another Plate of This?", discussing people's attitudes to life:
Conclusion, graphs, and references in article. As usual, I recommend reading Chronopause.com as Darwin has many good articles; to quickly link a few: