The problem with this is that, once we assign meaningful probabilities to Pascal's Wager, the conceit succeeds or fails based on those probabilities.
I don't see why that's a problem. If somehow it were known that there is a 1 in 3 chance that accepting Jesus would lead to an eternity in heaven, then Pascal's wager would start to make a lot more sense.
My estimate of a dystopian future in which you'd rather be dead than alive and, yet, somehow you are awakened into that world: basically zero.
That's not an answer to my question, since it excludes some scenarios where you are worse off for having chosen cryonics even if you are never frozen. Besides, I don't understand what you mean by "basically zero." Is it greater than zero?
some scenarios where you are worse off for having chosen cryonics even if you are never frozen.
I don't think I've seen any such scenarios explicitly displayed yet. Here's one that I think might be plausible:
Assume that cryonics and organ donation continue to be technically incompatible
Assume that organ donation becomes "opt-out" rather than "opt-in" (true in some places now, e.g. Spain)
Assume that opting out for organ donation makes one ineligible to receive a transplant (not true now, but I've heard it proposed) ( new informa
From Mike Darwn's Chronopause, an essay titled "Would You Like Another Plate of This?", discussing people's attitudes to life:
Conclusion, graphs, and references in article. As usual, I recommend reading Chronopause.com as Darwin has many good articles; to quickly link a few: