I think truels are a game-theoretic structure that suggests that there are costs to (short-sighted) "winning", just as there are costs to "truth-seeking".

I found the post interesting... except for this penultimate paragraph; I don't think there's a good analogy here. An evolutionary motive for "choking" or signaling choking is an interesting enough observation on its own.

LW is on refining the art of thinking; there's no need to strain for the segues.

(To be specific about where the analogy is strained: One question is about whether common human goals are likely to conflict with epistemic rationality; the other question is about signaling short-term failure as a road to long-term success under clearly defined criteria. Standard instrumental versus terminal goals, which is not at all as thorny as alleged instrumental epistemic stupidity.)

A very skillful gunman is a high-priority target, but also an attractive ally. I wonder what determines which effect dominates. (A wild stab: Social status is associated with number of allies, and with a moving average of accomplishment. If a low-status individual performs too well, but doesn't gratuitously signal submission, they are punished for getting uppity - by those with higher status to mitigate the threat, or by those with equal status to curry favor. A high-status individual, though, couldn't safely be punished even if anyone wanted to; seeking alliance is favorable.)

See also Wei Dai on a game where the smarter players lose.

In social science one is usually expected to outline some concrete real situation that you think is like the abstract game described. Just saying "here's a game, maybe there's some related real situation" is usually considered insufficient.

One question is to what extent truel situations produce mere underconfidence, versus actual mediocrity? As Johnnicholas aptly describes it, "fear of success" would be more a sign of underconfidence, while "choking under pressure" would produce mediocre performance. There is plenty of mediocrity in the world, but is it because of truels, or because everyone is trying as hard as they can to excel, but by definition only a few can rise above the crowd?

We have long discussed evolutionary situations where overconfidence is a benefit, so here we have a set of cases where underconfidence is good. This is a problem with evolutionary psychology, it is too easy to come up with theories that can explain anything. Whatever ratios we observe of overconfidence to underconfidence, we can explain them by postulating that the evolutionary environment had the corresponding ratios of scenarios where one or the other behavior would be of benefit.

The test would come if we could derive a prediction from this explanation which is non-obvious, and then we could see if underconfidence aligned with that prediction.

Interesting idea. If this was indeed a scenario that presented itself often in the Pleistocene, then we should expect individuals to signal that they do not do well under pressure (and in order to enable self-deception, actually believe that they will not do well), but consistently perform better under pressure than they expect to. There are cultural desires that shape our avowed expectations under many scenarios, so perhaps the best empirical test of this would be under a novel game situation.

If true, perhaps this could explain the pervasiveness of self-deprecating behavior?

This is a really good question.

As others have pointed out, the real issue is not competence but perceived competence. But as others haven't really pointed out, as one deals with more perceptive rivals, the difference between competence and perceived competence approaches zero (if only asymptotically).

As for the last question---what should we do in a truel-like situation---the answer is, I guess, "That depends." If we're talking about a situation where one can falsify incompetence, or perhaps form an unbreakable contract to act incompetently, then the old chestnut applies: rational agents should win. In a literal truel, you could do this by, say, agreeing to fire roughly one-third of your shots (chosen by die roll) straight into the air, provided there were a way of holding you to it. In other cases, as some people pointed out, maybe you could just get really good at convincing people of your incompetence (a.k.a. "nonchalance").

But in a situation where this is impossible? Where competence and perceived competence are one? Then there is no strategy, any more than there was a strategy for passing as white in the last century. You will be punished for being good (unless you're so good that you win anyway).

Regarding the evolution of mediocrity: In some cases, Evolution selects for people who are good at convincing others that they are X, and, by a not-so-stunning coincidence, ends up with people who actually believe they are X, or even really are X. I don't know if "competence" is the sort of thing this works for, though, since it is in itself a genetic advantage almost by definition. Self-perceieved incompetence is just so much better a strategy than actual incompetence, and self-delusion such a commonly evolved trait, that I have trouble believing even a dolt like Evolution would fail to think of it.

But is "winning" like gaining skill at shooting people, or skill at not getting shot, or skill at helping people shoot other people, or skill at helping people not get shot by other people? It seems to me that the game-theoretic effects here are all over the place, and for every truel there is an anti-truel.

Looks to me like LW's karma system also is a multi-truel. The slick rational gunfighters are voted up. Posts which resemble and repeat the slick actions of the mighty gunfighters are copied atnd affiliated up. The inept rationalists struggling to suggest new ways of gunfighting are voted down. Just my experience - that's all!