Eliezer_Yudkowsky comments on Kinnaird's truels - Less Wrong

25 Post author: Johnicholas 05 March 2009 04:50PM

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Comment author: Nick_Tarleton 05 March 2009 06:20:06PM *  6 points [-]

A very skillful gunman is a high-priority target, but also an attractive ally. I wonder what determines which effect dominates. (A wild stab: Social status is associated with number of allies, and with a moving average of accomplishment. If a low-status individual performs too well, but doesn't gratuitously signal submission, they are punished for getting uppity - by those with higher status to mitigate the threat, or by those with equal status to curry favor. A high-status individual, though, couldn't safely be punished even if anyone wanted to; seeking alliance is favorable.)

See also Wei Dai on a game where the smarter players lose.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 05 March 2009 07:01:13PM 6 points [-]

Wei Dai begins by assuming that cooperation on the Prisoner's Dilemma is not rational, which is the same decision theory that two-boxes on Newcomb's Problem.

Comment author: Wei_Dai 06 March 2009 08:31:21PM 6 points [-]

Last I saw, you were only advocating cooperation in one-shot PD for two superintelligences that happen to know each other's source code (http://lists.extropy.org/pipermail/extropy-chat/2008-May/043379.html). Are you now saying that human beings should also play cooperate in one-shot PD?

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 07 March 2009 01:11:11AM *  3 points [-]

What goes on with humans is no proof of what goes on with rational agents. Also, truly one-shot PDs will be very rare among real humans.