= 27d567bc2d48d9f40e9ccc20ea370b15)
Vladimir_M comments on Rationality Lessons Learned from Irrational Adventures in Romance - Less Wrong
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
= 783df68a0f980790206b9ea87794c5b6)
Loading…= b715d02e85f7b3b4ae65ca3d3e450868)
Subscribe to RSS Feed
Powered by Reddit
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d)
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
Comments (609)
Platonic?
If I step on your toe unintentionally, and you're in pain, just because I don't feel that pain (it wasn't my toe) doesn't mean that any harm done occurred either in a Platonic sense or not at all. It sure as heck doesn't mean that you're an ideologically-motivated, irrational zealot for getting mad when my response is anything other than "Whoops, sorry."
I do not think we share sufficient premises to make discussion worthwhile.
Yes, Platonic -- and it's easy to demonstrate that it follows in a straightforward manner from your phrasing.
To stick with the (relatively) less incendiary of the two, consider the notion of "sexism." Discussing whether some institution, act, or claim is "sexist" makes sense only if at least one of these two conditions applies:
There is some objectively existing Platonic idea of "sexism," so that whether something is "sexist" is ultimately a question of fact that must have an objectively correct yes or no answer.
There is a precise and agreed-upon definition of "sexism," so that whether something is "sexist" is, assuming agreement on questions of fact, ultimately a question of logic (i.e. whether the given facts satisfy the definition), which also must have an objectively correct yes or no answer.
Now, the option (2) is clearly out of the question. This is because the term inherently implies that any "sexist" claim does not belong to the set of reasonable and potentially correct claims and a "sexist" institution or act is outside the bounds of what is defensible and acceptable -- while at the same time nobody has ever given any definition of "sexism" that wouldn't be either so restrictive as to make most of the common usage of the term inconsistent with the definition, or so broad as to make many reasonable and defensible claims and institutions "sexist," thus again contradicting this essential implication of the term. Also, the very fact that you talk about "arguing [...] whether or not you can be [...] sexist [...] without [property X]" implies that there exists some Platonic idea of "sexism," since otherwise it would be a trivial question of whether property X is included in the definition.
It is trivial. Jandila's definition of sexism and racism does not include the speaker being a bigot as a necessary criterion. Now, I often complain to my anti-subordination activisty friends that a lot of people don't realize their definitions of racism and sexism don't imply that. It's a problem since people tend to get more defensive than they need to be when someone points out something they did or said that is racist, sexist, anti- gay, etc. But people getting defensive after they know these words don't imply bigotry really is silly. And yet it still happens-- which is why Jandila doesn't always have the patience to deal with it.
That's because words like "bigot, racist, sexist, anti- gay" are frequently used to sneak in conotations that the argument in question (and by extension the person making it) is somehow immoral and can be dismissed without looking at its validity, or at the very least requires us to engage in motivated continuation until the argument has been "rationally" dismissed. If you and Jandila don't mean to sneak in these connotations, say so; however, in that case you should probably pick a word that doesn't have these connotations in common usage.
I didn't mind being told my behavior pattern matches with that of bad people's by people who I thought think probabilistically.
If someone were to see me handcuffed in the back of a police car with blood all over me, they should think me more likely to have killed someone than if they hadn't seen that. If they concluded I killed someone because they saw me there, they would just be stupid.
Scary thing is: The jury is made up of these people!
All I really need is for two (Asch conformity) of twelve regular people who accept stupid arguments to accept arguments I am not guilty, or one nut juror, or one intelligent juror.
I am reticent to discuss this without there being any object level issue-- I don't trust either side's claims about how these words are 'frequently used'. I would be comfortable evaluating a specific instance of the use of these words but I suspect discussion of how they tend to be used will just leave people insisting on generalities that flatter their own ideology. Both sides have ways of framing the other's rhetorical techniques as harmful and destructive to honest communication. And both sides are often oblivious to what the other side is saying. Usually when words like sexist and racist are thrown out the users usually have reasons why they used those words instead of others despite (or I guess sometimes because of) connotations. But again, those reasons can't be evaluated in abstract.
I think that the burden of proof is on those criticizing authors for using particular language.
It ought to disqualify the prosecutors from bringing such cases if there can't be evidence to support them, so it seems to me you're on a "side" if you think that.
Both sides are criticizing the other for using particular language. Bob says x. Susan says saying x is racist (criticizing Bob). Bob says saying something is racist sneaks in connotations (criticizing Susan).
I don't know what you're talking about here.
Edit: If I understand you right I guess I don't see a justification for 'burden of proof' type analyses except in literal court rooms. There usually isn't a reason for them other than presumption and status quo bias.
The criticisms are importantly different.
"Susan says saying x is racist."
There is nothing wrong with that statement, but "arguing [...] whether or not you can be racist/sexist/whatever without intentionally being a bigot," is confused, though not necessarily accusatory.
"Bob says saying something is racist sneaks in connotations."
Bob is saying something not confused, but coherent and accusatory. "If you and Jandila don't mean to sneak in these connotations, say so;" is unfair. Bob has to address the argument as if those connotations were not intended, even if they probably were (in his mind), or weren't but probably are so misinterpreted by others (in his models of them), he can't decline to address the actual argument unless he has overwhelming evidence that it was designed primarily to manipulate and not substantially to present evidence.
If it's easier for Bob to show the argument is dishonest rather than refute it, it's fine to let him do that if he feels it is better for some reason, and I don't think Bob owes an explanation of how the argument was wrong or even an honest attempt to try and understand it, depending on how sinuous and sinuous it was.
(...)
The problem is that without the connotations associated with the word, Susan's statement doesn't even constitute a counter argument.
Susan's statement isn't supposed to be a counter argument, just an argument. (When I described the situation above I could have as easily started with "Bob does something racist" instead of "says. She may or may not have a propositional disagreement with what Bob said.)
[And now we have two threads about Bob. He is apparently both a racist and terrible with women.]
What if someone thought that even with the connotations associated with the word, it still wouldn't constitute a counter argument?
Btw, Could you provide your definition of "bigot"? I've gotten a vague idea of what you mean by the word from context, but I'd like to see your formulation. (Note: be prepared to explain why being a "bigot" is obviously a "very bad thing".)
Wikipedia looks fine:
I am not so prepared-- though it doesn't seem especially controversial to me I am vaguely open to an argument that it isn't obvious. But I don't see why I should be expected to explain why.
So if I believe that, say, religion X is wrong and its teachings are immoral, do I qualify as a bigot under this definition?
Only if you are therefore hostile to its members.
Depending on what you mean by "hostile" that may be a perfectly reasonable course of action.
Thats a unique example in that definition, that, in retrospect I should have perhaps left out. Unlike the other groupings religion partly consists in beliefs and values which I think it is often important to be hostile to. Those beliefs and values are closely tied to the culture of a religion which I don't think people should be hostile to. I would not call someone a bigot for criticizing, mocking or insulting the beliefs and values associated with a particular religion. Doing the same to the people themselves or the culture, purposefully, and not the result of merely being uninformed or temporarily blinded would make a person a bigot.
What exactly is the criterion for being an element on the list?
Obviously it's specific contents are political and I don't necessarily think it is complete (or as we seen without mistakes)-- but the criteria for an ideal list is something like 'classes of people that agents cannot help but be members of'.
And that's the problem given that politics is the mindkiller.
What do you label with that symbol? How do you know no aspect of any of them should be criticized, mocked, or insulted?
Good point. Consider it striked.
I had assigned what felt like a 10% probability to your defending that without falling to the no true Scotsman fallacy, so I am disappointed.
Also, what do you mean by hostile?
If I believe it's better for people not to have behavioral disorders or/and addictive disorders develop a treatment and encourage people with said disorders to take it, am I being hostile? What if I do the same w.r.t. homosexuality?
BTW, if the answer to both those questions is "no", I have no further problem with the definition.
Treating someone like an enemy. Shrug. I don't have a clear bright line or anything, the amount and intensity of bigotry someone must exhibit before I'm comfortable calling them a bigoted person is pretty high.
In both cases it depends on why you want people to take the treatment.
We're now very far from what was a pretty contingent defense of another commenter's position and I don't especially enjoy the topic...
Replace "sexism" by "X". Do you think this alternative is still valid?
Or maybe you should elaborate on why you think "sexism" gives rise to this alternative.
Of course it is still valid, unless X corresponds directly to some observable and clearly identifiable element of physical reality, so that its existence is not Platonic, but physically real. Obviously it wouldn't make sense to discuss whether someone has, say, committed theft if there didn't exist a precise and agreed-upon definition of what counts as theft -- or otherwise we would be hunting for some objectively existing Platonic idea of "theft" in order to see whether it applies.
Now of course, in human affairs no definition is perfectly precise, and there will always be problematic corner cases where there may be much disagreement. This precision is ultimately a matter of degree. However, to use the same example again, when people are accused of theft, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the only disagreement is whether the facts of the accusation are correct, and it's only very rarely that even after the facts are agreed upon, there is significant disagreement over whether what happened counts as theft. In contrast, when people are accused of sexism, a discussion almost always immediately starts about whether what they did was really and truly "sexist," even when there is no disagreement at all about what exactly was said or done.
Of course? There must be a miscommunication.
Do you think it makes sense to discuss, say, intelligence, friendship or morality? Do you think these exist either as physically real things or Platonic ideas, or can you supply precise and agreed-upon definitions for them?
I don't count any of my three examples physically real in the sense of being a clearly identifiable part of physical reality. Of course they reduce to physical things at the bottom, but only in the trivial sense in which everything does. Knowing that the reduction exists is one thing, but we don't judge things as intelligent, friendly or moral based on their physical configuration, but on higher-order abstractions. I'm not expecting us to have a disagreement here. I wouldn't consider any of the examples a Platonic idea either. Our concepts and intuitions do not have their source in some independently existing ideal world of perfections. Since you seemed to point to Platonism as a fallacy, we probably don't disagree here either.
So I'm led to expect that you think that to sensibly discuss whether a given behaviour is intelligent, friendly or moral, we need to be able to give precise definitions for intelligence, friendship and morality. But I can only think that this is fundamentally misguided: the discussions around these concepts are relevant precisely because we do not have such definitions at hand. We can try to unpack our intuitions about what we think of as a concept, for example by tabooing the word for it. But this is completely different from giving a definition.
This only reflects on the easiest ways of making or defending against particular kinds of accusations, not at all on the content of the accusations. Morality is similar to sexism in this respect, but it still makes sense to discuss morality without being a Platonist about it or without giving a precise agreed-upon definition.
Well, morality is such an enormous and multi-sided topic that what usually matters in a concrete situation is only some particular small subset of morality. A discussion can be meaningful if there is agreement on the issue at hand, even if there is disagreement otherwise. So to take the same example again, if we're discussing whether someone is a thief (i.e has committed the sort of immoral behavior that is called "theft"), it doesn't matter if we define murder differently, as long as we define theft the same.
But yes, of course that discussing whether a given behavior is intelligent, friendly, or moral makes sense only if we agree on the definitions of these terms. As I said above, in practice our definitions about human affairs are always fuzzy and incomplete to some degree, so there will always be disagreement at least in some corner cases, and discussions will be meaningful as long as they stick to the broader area of agreement. However, in case of friendship, intelligence, and most issues of morality, people typically agree at least roughly on the relevant definitions, so the usage of these words is usually meaningful.
Also, when people agree on definitions, it doesn't matter if they are able to state these definitions precisely and explicitly, as long as there is no disagreement on whether the definitions are satisfied assuming given facts. Giving a precise definition of "friendship" would be a difficult task for most people, but it doesn't matter since there is no significant disagreement on what behavior is expected from people one considers as friends, and what behavior should disqualify them. One the other hand, when someone makes vague ideological accusations such as "sexism," there is no such agreement at all, and a rational discussion can't even being before a clear definition of the term is given.