Will_Newsome comments on Are Deontological Moral Judgments Rationalizations? - Less Wrong

37 Post author: lukeprog 16 August 2011 04:40PM

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Comment author: Kaj_Sotala 16 August 2011 07:22:33PM 5 points [-]

But this still doesn't answer the question. If you believe that killing a fetus is murder, then a woman seeking an abortion pays a doctor to commit murder. Why don't abortionists want to change the laws so that abortion is considered murder and a woman who has an abortion can be charged with paying a doctor to commit murder? Psychologist Robert Kurzban cites this as a classic case of moral rationalization.

IAWYC, but the obvious alternative explanation in this example is that the person in question does believe that killing a fetus is murder and that the doctor should be tried for it, but also realizes that expressing such a radical opinion would harm the cause. So he refuses to answer. Of course, the fact that he can get away with simply refusing to answer is suspicious, and there are plenty of more damning examples.

Regardless, I find this to be a great post. Though readers would also do well to remind themselves that you can't derive ought from is - just because deontological judgements would be defended by rationalizations, it wouldn't mean the judgements themselves would be wrong. (As moral judgments can't be right or wrong, only something you agree or disagree with. No XML tags in the universe, and so forth.)

Comment author: Will_Newsome 16 August 2011 08:24:26PM 2 points [-]

As moral judgments can't be right or wrong, only something you agree or disagree with.

This is highly contentious; did you mean to state it so confidently?

Comment author: Kaj_Sotala 16 August 2011 09:52:56PM 0 points [-]

Yes, but see also my response to Luke.