Vladimir_Nesov comments on Are Deontological Moral Judgments Rationalizations? - Less Wrong

37 Post author: lukeprog 16 August 2011 04:40PM

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Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 17 August 2011 11:47:32PM *  0 points [-]

Consider an analogy with empirical judgements. Suppose someone says "Earth is flat." Are they stating a proposition about the way the world is, or just expressing that they have a certain belief? If it's the latter, then they can't be wrong (assuming they're not deliberately lying).

They can be wrong if they should on reflection change this belief.

Comment author: Wei_Dai 18 August 2011 12:06:20AM 3 points [-]

Nesov, I'm taking emotivism to be the theory that moral judgments are just expressions of current emotional attitude, and therefore can't be wrong, even if on reflection one would change one's emotional attitude. And I'm arguing against that theory.

Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 18 August 2011 12:26:50AM 0 points [-]

Ah, I see, that was stupid misinterpretation on my part.