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Douglas_Knight comments on Decision Theory Paradox: PD with Three Implies Chaos? - Less Wrong
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In a simple special case where everything is symmetric, they will cooperate if the problem is formalized in the spirit of TDT, but this is basically good old superrationality, not something TDT-specific. The doubt I expressed is about the case where the TDT agents are not exactly symmetric, so that each of them can't automagically assume that the other will do exactly the same thing. In the context of this post, this assumption may be necessary.
I think it is unfair to TDT to say that it is just Hofstadter's superrationality. If TDT is an actual algorithm to which Hofstadter's argument applies, even just in the purely symmetric version, that is a great advance. I would definitely say that about UDT.
Yes, TDT is underspecified. But is it a class of fully specified algorithms, all of which cooperate with pure clones, or is it not clear if there is any way of specifying which logical counterfactuals it can consider?
Two relevant links: Gary Drescher on a problem with (a specification of?) TDT; you on underspecification.