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Manfred comments on A History of Bayes' Theorem - Less Wrong
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Comments (85)
I shared the link to this post on an IRC channel populated by a number of people, but mostly by mathematically inclined CS majors. It provoked a bunch of discussion about the way frequentism/bayesianism is generally discussed on LW. Here are a few snippets from the conversation (nicknames left out except my own, less relevant lines have been edited out):
11:03 < Person A> For fucks sake "And so at age 62, Laplace — the world's first Bayesian — converted to frequentism, which he used for the remaining 16 years of his life."
11:04 <@Guy B> well he believed that the results were the same
11:04 <@Guy B> counterexamples were invented only later
11:05 < Person A> Guy B: Still, I just hate the way that lesswrong talks about "bayesians" and "frequentists"
11:05 <@Guy B> Person A: oh, I misinterpreted you
11:06 < Person A> Every time yudkowsky writes "The Way of Bayes" i get a sudden urge to throw my laptop out of the window.
11:08 < Person A> Yudkowsky is a really good popular writer, but I hate the way he tries to create strange conflicts even where they don't exist.
11:10 <@Xuenay> I guess I should point out that the article in question wasn't written by Yudkowsky :P
11:10 <@Dude C> Xuenay: it was posted on lesswrong
11:11 <@Dude C> so obv we will talk about Yudkowski
11:13 <@Dude C> it's just htat there is no conflict, there are just several ways to do that.
11:13 <@Dude C> several models
11:16 <@Dude C> uh, several modes
11:17 <@Dude C> or I guess several schools. w/e.
11:17 <@Entity D> it's like this stupid philosophical conflict over two mathematically valid ways of doing statistical inference, a conflict some people seem to take all too seriously
11:17 <@Guy B> IME self-described bayesians are always going on about this "conflict"
11:17 <@Guy B> while most people just concentrate on science
11:18 <@Entity D> Guy B: exactly
11:18 <@Dude C> and use appropriate methods where they are appropriate
Summing up, the general consensus on the channel is that the whole frequentist/bayesian conflict gets seriously and annoyingly exaggarated on LW, and that most people doing science are happy to use either methodology if that suits the task at hand. Those who really do care and could reasonably be described as 'frequentist' or 'bayesian' are really a small minority, and LW's way of constantly bringing it up is just something that's used to make the posters feel smugly superior to "those clueless frequentists". This consensus has persisted over an extended time, and has contributed to LW suffering from a lack of credibility in the eyes of many of the channel regulars.
Does anybody better versed in the debate have a comment?
But the content in my post isn't by Less Wrong, it's by McGrayne.
The history in McGrayne's book is an excellent substantiation of just how deep, serious, and long-standing the debate between frequentism and Bayesianism really is. If they want, they can check the notes at the back of McGrayne's book and read the original articles from people like Fisher and Jeffreys. McGrayne's book is full of direct quotes, filled with venom for the 'opposing' side.
My problem, and likely the chatters', is that by leading a team cheer for one audience, the larger neutral audience feels excluded. Doesn't really matter whose words it was.
And while most of the history was very interesting, some of it felt cherry-picked or spun, adding to that feeling of team-ization.
I don't think "neutral" is quite the right word for the audience in question. It may be the best one, but there is more to it, as it only captures the group's view of itself, and not how others might see it.
The Bayesians (vegetarians) see the "neutrals" (omnivores) as non-understanding (animal-killers). The neutrals see themselves as partaking of the best tools (foods) there are, both Bayesian and frequentist (vegetable and animal), and think that when Bayesians call them "non-Bayesians" (animal-killers) the Bayesians are making a mistake of fact by thinking that they are frequentists (carnivores). Sometimes Bayesians even say "frequentist" when context makes it obvious they mean "non-Bayesian" (or that they are making a silly mistake, which is what the threatened "neutrals" are motivated to assume).
As neutrals is absolutely how those in the group in question see themselves, but also true is that Bayesians see them as heretics, (murderers of Bambi, Thumper, and Lambchop), or what have you, without them making a mistake of fact. The Bayesian theoretical criticisms should not be brushed aside on the grounds that they are out of touch with how things are done, and do not understand that it that most use all available tools (are omnivorous). They can be addressed by invoking the outside view against the inside view, or practice against theory, etc. (these are arguments in which Bayesians and frequentists are joined against neutrals) and subsequently (if the "neutrals" (omnivores) do not win against the Bayesians [and their frequentist allies {those favoring pure diets}] outright in that round) on the well worn Bayesian (vegetarian) v. frequentist (carnivore) battlegrounds.
I think vegetarian-carnivore metaphor here doesn't help at all :)
I found it helpful. But I'm an omnivore so I (mistakenly) think that I don't have a dog in that fight.
This is quite possible, but there is some irony here - you have misrepresented the analogy by describing a three category grouping system by naming two of its categories, implying it is about opposites!
I think that people do this too often in general and that it is implicated in this debate's confused character. Hence, the analogy with more than a dichotomy of oppositional groups!
Realising that it is a three-way split, not a two-way split is my latest hammer. See me use it in Is Bayesian probability individual, situational, or transcendental: a break with the usual subjective/objective bun fight.
Having said that, I find myself agreeing with kurokikaze; the vegetarian-omnivore-carnivore metaphor doesn't help. The spilt blood (and spilt sap) distract from, and obscure, the "Three, not two" point.